AS military convoys wound through the coastal routes of Sabah for the Keris Strike exercises, they offered a stark reminder of a relationship that operates away from the headlines.
Keris Strike is an annual military exercise involving forces from Australia, Malaysia, and the United States; it took place at Kota Belud earlier this year.
These tactical engagements, alongside maritime security cooperation, underscore a quiet reality: defence cooperation between Putrajaya and Washington is a key stabiliser in South-East Asia. Yet as competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, this status quo faces new pressures.
While formally a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Malaysia-US security relationship is frequently underestimated. Washington is a crucial economic partner – particularly for Penang’s semiconductor hub – and a steady, low-profile defence collaborator rooted in intelligence sharing, maritime assistance, and joint training.
But as Putrajaya updates its strategic baseline through the mid-term review of its Defence White Paper, navigating a narrowing margin for neutrality requires a more active approach.
To safeguard their interests, Putrajaya and Washington should optimise their defence cooperation across six areas.
First, the two capitals should strengthen and institutionalise existing working-level defence channels. Rather than creating new, high-visibility ministerial forums, Putrajaya and Washington should double down on platforms like the Bilateral Training and Consultative Group and the Malaysia-US Strategic Talks.
Keeping defence ties anchored at the senior official and military staff level insulates the relationship from volatile domestic political transitions on both sides, shields cooperation from heightened public sensitivities over broader US foreign policy – such as divergent stances on the Middle East – and prevents unnecessary increase in major-power friction.
Maintaining working-level continuity does not mean staying static, however. The two capitals should use the landmark 2025 memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation to operationalise these channels. Negotiated under the Strategic Talks, the MOU provides a framework to streamline routine schedules, expand joint exercises, and finalise targeted technical agreements – such as geospatial sharing, communications security, and logistics – without turning cooperation into a public lightning rod.
Second, bilateral efforts should focus on sustaining and integrating existing maritime domain awareness capabilities. US contributions – ranging from ScanEagle reconnaissance drones and radar arrays to upgraded maritime patrol aircraft and transferred Coast Guard cutters – have boosted Malaysia’s ability to monitor its exclusive economic zones off Sabah and Sarawak’s coasts. This capacity is essential as Putrajaya faces persistent grey-zone intrusions near vital offshore energy sites like Luconia Shoals and the Kasawari gas field.
Given Putrajaya’s fiscal constraints, the priority should shift from acquiring expensive new platforms to maximising asset sustainment, maintenance pipelines, and real-time intelligence integration. Delivering low-cost lifecycle support for existing systems provides operational value without straining Malaysia’s defence budget.
To complement these physical assets, Washington should expand non-sensitive data sharing and commercial satellite imagery, giving Putrajaya high-impact, real-time visibility over its maritime domain.
Crucially, deeper tactical coordination should remain grounded in capacity-building and shared access, respecting sovereignty while avoiding permanent foreign basing.
Third, joint exercises should continue to adapt to modern asymmetrical threats while building regulatory frameworks for emerging domains.
While the 14 annual bilateral and multilateral exercises already incorporate cyberdefence, humanitarian response, and complex fire missions, future coordination should look beyond these efforts. Protecting critical subsea infrastructure, for instance, represents a crucial domain where both sides should establish legal and technical working groups to address regulatory hurdles before operationalising joint protection.
Fourth, Putrajaya and Washington should leverage defence procurement to catalyse broader civilian technology and economic growth. Rather than relying solely on traditional defence-industrial offsets – a framework that often yields limited long-term technology transfer – cooperation should target dual-use technologies, commercial aerospace maintenance, repair and overhaul hubs, and critical supply chain resilience. Such a focus respects Malaysia’s multi-vendor defence acquisition strategy while unlocking high-value commercial integration for US firms.
Operationalising recent bilateral commitments – such as the MOU on critical minerals supply chains – will further embed defence cooperation within both countries’ broader industrial strategies. In doing so, aligning defence acquisitions with Malaysia’s economic priorities generates domestic political support while reinforcing mutual economic security.
Fifth, bilateral defence initiatives should anchor the US within the frameworks of Asean. Sub-regional mechanisms like the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Malacca Strait patrols work because major powers are not involved, keeping those formats localised and insulated from geopolitical tensions.
To integrate the US without disrupting these dynamics, both capitals should leverage the Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, the ideal venue for Washington to co-chair exercises and build capacity alongside regional militaries. Supporting Asean centrality through this structure strengthens regional stability without forcing South-East Asian countries into a polarised binary.
Finally, both countries should invest in the next generation of strategic talent. Expanding track-2 diplomacy, civilian-military exchanges, and professional fellowships will cultivate a network of security experts with first-hand institutional nuance. This human capital ensures that the bilateral relationship remains resilient regardless of leadership changes in Putrajaya or Washington.
A modernised defence partnership with the US neither compromises Malaysia’s non-aligned stance nor jeopardises its broader economic relationships. Nonalignment is not passive isolation; it is the autonomy to choose partnerships that reinforce national sovereignty. By refining security ties with Washington on its own terms – quietly, pragmatically, and effectively – Putrajaya chooses its own future.
David Santoro is president and CEO of the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum in the United States which runs the annual Honolulu Defense Forum, an event that facilitates dialogue between public and private sector actors to bolster regional security.
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