France and Germany have ramped up diplomatic efforts to contain the fallout from an escalating Middle East oil crisis, seeking to project European autonomy and distance themselves from the US-Israeli war on Iran.
But as the conflict entered its second month, analysts said this was more about damage control than a leadership bid. They said while Berlin and Paris were at the forefront of calls for de-escalation they had limited room for manoeuvre given their security dependence on Washington.
Joint American-Israeli strikes on Iran that began on February 28 have killed dozens of senior Iranian officials, including former supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the first wave.
In retaliation, Iran’s missile strikes targeting Gulf countries aligned with the US have had a significant impact on the global energy chain, and it has effectively blocked the Strait of Hormuz through which roughly 20 per cent of the world’s oil supply travels.
Oil prices have surged, threatening European economies, as the strait’s daily transits dropped to a small fraction of its baseline of 130 vessels.
Paris and Berlin have condemned Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes and the closure of the strait and refused to join the American military campaign.
French President Emmanuel Macron has consistently dismissed a military reopening of the waterway as “unrealistic”, instead advocating for a UN-backed diplomatic moratorium to restore freedom of navigation. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s approach is defined by pragmatic restraint, shielding the country’s industrial core from an unmanageable energy shock.
The two powers have also launched multilateral crisis management, including pushing for the International Energy Agency’s record-breaking release of emergency oil stocks.
Meanwhile, representatives from over 40 countries, excluding the US, met virtually on Thursday to begin forming a coalition to secure the Gulf shipping channel, with the UK and its allies agreeing to explore sanctions to pressure Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
But observers said that without the military or economic tools to enforce an outcome, their influence may be more aspirational than operational.
“[Their] autonomy is more about damage control rather than a quest for leadership,” said Ding Yifan, a senior fellow with Renmin University’s Institute of Global Governance and Development in Beijing.
“Their core objective is to avoid being entangled in US military adventures and to preserve space for diplomatic mediation while upholding international law and strategic autonomy.”
Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa, a geopolitical strategist specialising in EU-Asia relations, said: “Germany and France have neither the political authority at home, nor the economic margin to absorb shocks, nor the technologies/military power that would make others listen.
“What they are doing is to manage irrelevance [in a way that’s] dressed as initiative.”
Experts also question whether a coalition of established middle powers like Berlin and Paris, acting without Washington, can actually move the needle.
“In a hard-conflict scenario like the Strait of Hormuz, middle-power soft power tops out quickly,” said James Downes, director of the Europe-Asia programme at the US-based Centre for Explanatory Research and Scientific Prediction.
“[France and Germany] can nudge short-term calm and show some independence from the US, but any lasting energy diplomacy rules require Washington’s buy-in to avoid isolation.”
Ding echoed that view, stressing that the two powers “remain constrained by their security dependence on the US – exemplified by the use of their bases by the US military – and internal divisions, with Eastern European nations still requiring American protection”.
Contin Trillo-Figueroa said the era of European leverage had diminished.
He argued that while Berlin and Paris were central to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, they were no longer at the table where the real decisions were made.
“That is simply not the case any more,” he said.
Back then, France, Germany and the UK were the architects of the deal – known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – that traded nuclear restrictions for the lifting of international sanctions.
Under the landmark agreement, Tehran accepted strict oversight of its nuclear programme before the United States unilaterally withdrew from the pact in 2018.
Contin Trillo-Figueroa said that if Berlin and Paris could not offer military or economic alternatives, their diplomacy was at risk of becoming performative.
“You do not mediate a chokepoint conflict with moral authority and joint statements ... the age of soft power as a substitute for hard capacity is over, and it ended rather loudly,” he said.
Analysts said the sustainability of the “middle power” stance was also tied to the ticker tape of oil prices.
“If fuel shortages persist and oil prices keep surging, these middle powers will face a binary choice: capitulate to Washington’s military agenda, or accept a compromise with Tehran that effectively legitimises the blockade,” Ding said.
He also warned that France and Germany’s energy crisis-driven leadership would be short-lived.
“The moment oil prices stabilise, Paris and Berlin’s diplomatic influence is likely to evaporate just as quickly,” Ding said.
“European consensus on strategic autonomy is driven by immediate crises rather than long-term alignment, lacking the institutional framework to sustain consistent leadership.”
