Limiting PM’s term to 10 years

Let us not turn back on this very desirable proposed amendment.

THE much-awaited Constitutional (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2026 to limit the prime minister’s tenure to an aggregate of 10 years has been introduced in Parliament. As is to be expected in a democratic process, there is some opposition to the Bill.

Some MPs are opposed to its merits and principles. Others support the idea of the Bill but wish greater scrutiny of its details. Both groups must be engaged.

The main objections to or suggestions relating to the Bill are the following:

Curtailment of the King’s power: It is alleged that the amendment is unconstitutional as it would curtail the prerogative power of the King under Article 43(2)(a) to appoint a PM “who in his judgment is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of (the Dewan Rakyat)”.

In answer to this criticism, it needs to be pointed out that though the appointment of the PM is indeed one of the most important of the King’s royal powers, His Majesty’s discretion is not absolute. The PM must belong to the Dewan Rakyat. He/she must be “likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of that House”. He/she must not be a citizen by naturalisation or registration.

In its pith and substance, the Bill is not meant to curb royal powers but to provide for periodic renewal of top national leadership.

It is noteworthy that time limits or age limits run through the whole gamut of royal appointments. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong himself is limited to five years under Article 32(2).

Forty-four senators appointed by the King are limited to two terms of three years each under Article 45(3A). A host of other top officers, appointed by the King at his discretion, are subject to a retirement age.

Further, under Article 43(4), if the PM ceases to command the confidence of the Dewan Rakyat, then unless at his request the King dissolves Parliament, the PM shall tender the resignation of the Cabinet. Surely, a vote of no-confidence against the PM is not an affront to the powers of the King who appointed the PM.

Consent of the Conference of Rulers: Some opponents of the Bill have argued that a two-thirds majority in both Houses under Article 159(3) is not enough to pass the Bill. They allege that the consent of the Conference of Rulers is needed under Articles 159(5) and 38(4). Their argument is that any law that curtails the powers of the King affects the privileges, position, honours or dignities of the Rulers and shall not be passed without the consent of the Conference of Rulers.

This specious argument was soundly rejected in the case of Phang Chin Hock (1980), where the court held that the position of the federal King is legally distinct from the position of the state Sultans. As such, an amendment to affect the powers of the King does not have to be submitted to the Conference of Rulers.

Need for fine-tuning at committee stage: Many supporters of the Bill recommend that a closer scrutiny and fine-tuning at committee stage is needed. This proposal is worthy of consideration even though the Legal Affairs Division under Datuk Seri Azalina Othman Said has taken great pains to hear out social activists, academics and media representatives.

There are two possibilities. Under Standing Orders 54(1) and 55(1) of the Dewan Rakyat, a Select Committee could be appointed before the second reading in the House to scrutinise the merits and principles of the proposed amendment.

Alternatively, under Standing Order 55(2), the Bill can be committed to a Select Committee after the second reading to discuss its details but not its principle and merit.

Calculation of 10 years: The Bill is rather generous – and perhaps rightly so – about how the 10-year time limit is to be determined.

Under the new Article 43(2A), the 10-year rule appears to be strict. It is “aggregate ten years, either continuously or otherwise”.

However, any period as “caretaker” or “interim” PM is not to be counted. Under the new Article 43(4D)(b) “any period during which the person performs the functions of Prime Minister following the dissolution of Parliament ... shall not be taken into account”. This refers to the period after a dissolution during which the incumbent PM is conventionally a “caretaker PM”. This period can last up to 120 days under Article 55(4).

If there is a proclaimed emergency under Article 150(1) – as in 1969 – then the period as caretaker has no limit. In 1969, the caretaker PM served for about 22 months before Parliament came back to session.

What is the position if, after an election, there is a “hung Parliament” and no stable majority government can be appointed under Article 43(2)(a)?

Under the new Article 43(4C), “The person who ceases to hold office as Prime Minister under Clause (4A) and the members of the Cabinet who cease to hold office under Clause (4B) shall continue to discharge the functions of their office until a new Prime Minister is appointed...”. This means that the period as interim PM is not relevant to the determination of 10 years.

Fixed-term Parliament: Under Article 55(3), the life of Parliament is five years unless sooner dissolved by the King on the advice of the PM. Under Article 40(2), His Majesty has discretion to refuse such advice. However, in those cases when the advice is accepted, the PM is given an unfair advantage to choose the timing of his electoral battle with the opposition.

The absence of a fixed-term parliament also complicates the working of the 10-year rule for the PM’s tenure. Let’s say a PM is in his second term and completes four years of this second term and succeeds in getting Parliament dissolved. If he wins the next election, he is still eligible to be appointed PM for the next one year! This may result in lack of stability, continuity or unnecessary change of leadership one year after a general election.

Many other such possibilities lurk under the surface.

Life is always larger than the law, and no law can be perfect in content or totally comprehensive in detail. Solutions proposed by a law often generate their own problems!

But this is not an excuse for inertia. Let us not turn back on this very desirable proposed amendment. After some further urgent discussion, let us proceed with the parliamentary stages in both Houses, the assent of His Majesty and the gazetting of the Amendment Act.

Emeritus Professor Datuk Dr Shad Saleem Faruqi is principal research fellow at Universiti Malaya. He wishes all Muslim brethren the blessing of Ramadan. The views expressed here are the writer’s own.