Roar of a paper tiger?

Other than Trump's outlandish global ambitions, his domestic policies are also causing anger among Americans, like these protesters in Phoenix, Arizona. — Reuters

THE shock and dread from Donald Trump’s assault on Venezuela and his kidnapping of President Maduro and his wife continue to reverberate worldwide.

The actions were technically of the US government’s executive branch, but the brazenness was typically Trump with neither consultation with nor approval from an enraged Congress. Once more, unlawful acts were committed with unilateralism taken to extremes.

The mix of the familiar and the unprecedented has confounded many to the point of confusion. The deadly actions were illegal internationally and unconstitutional within the US, while the consequences unleashed may never be managed by the present or any future White House administration.

Not that the incumbents are bothered by the prospect of cascading woes to come. Their record has been a string of aggravations and unresolved hardships for future generations and administrations to suffer.

The one redeeming feature of this criminality, if there can be any, is in targeting a defenceless Third World country like Venezuela rather than a nuclear-armed power. Last weekend’s military assault was over almost as soon as it started.

The “short, sharp shock” approach is Trump’s signature style, from the April 2017 missile attack on Syria to last June’s aerial bombing of Iran’s nuclear energy facilities. But while fighting smaller countries may seem less risky than confronting bigger ones like Russia and China, it need not be safer.

The US military fought the “barefoot soldiers” of the Vietcong and Viet Minh for 20 years and still lost. A generation later, the US fought Afghanistan’s Taliban for another 20 years and lost again.

With the urge to keep a war machine well oiled, Trump’s style is to conduct conflict in brief encounters. Picking fights with small countries instead of large ones further minimises costs.

Much in Trump 2.0 is familiar fare with previous US regimes. This includes a preference for attacking weaker and poorer countries that cannot adequately defend themselves.

The US invaded Panama in 1989 and kidnapped its leader Gen Manuel Noriega on allegations of drug trafficking. Washington flouted international law on multiple occasions to subvert sovereign nations, incite wars and topple elected governments from Chile to Ukraine.

Trump 2.0’s cavalier adventurism further resets standards in three main dimensions:

pronounced regional dominance for competing superpowers, increasing US withdrawal from the international community, and a loosening of the Western alliance towards dissolution.

Trump has declared a reborn Monroe Doctrine with clear US dominance of its region to the exclusion of other major powers. This century-old policy was originally for keeping European powers out of the Americas, with Trump intending to refashion it to prevent other major powers like China prospering with trade partners in South America.

At the same time, Trump is effectively leaving East Asia to its own devices as China continues to develop. This is happening as he sheds US responsibility in Nato.

Nonetheless, the inconsistency in making tough demands elsewhere is not going down well even with his own base. Former loyalists like Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene insist that wild foreign policy forays like attacking Venezuela and claiming Greenland betray the “America First” platform while only feeding a bottomless Military-Industrial Complex.

In demanding Venezuelan oil, Greenland’s minerals, Mexico’s and Canada’s compliance and Cuba’s and Colombia’s docility, Trump is seen as overreaching while ignoring US domestic needs. Even the attack on Venezuela is far from a done deal since there is no plan to bind its government to serve US interests.

This new foreign policy focus sits uncomfortably with a turn towards more insularity as Trump also looks inwards. He is withdrawing the US from more than 60 international organisations including several important UN agencies.

The result is an abdication of international responsibility by a foremost global power. The irony is for this to happen at a time when the world needs more solutions, and funding, for problems that the US itself had created.

Meanwhile what may be left of the Western alliance and Nato’s prospects in particular are very much in question. There were already hints of a policy upheaval with Trump’s attitude to Ukraine and a peace settlement there.

The biggest loser is Europe, which now has to pay more for lesser security assurances. Despite much talk there is still no signed agreement on a security guarantee for Ukraine, much less anything else.

Similar implications apply to US alliance relationships in Asia. Japan’s indelicate posture on China that relies on robust US support may find that it had over-invested in Washington.

If all this has been happening within only the first year of Trump 2.0, what will another three years bring?

Despite a profound foreboding, the midterm elections this November may act as a brake on Trump’s outlandish ambitions. Midterms usually frustrate incumbents, particularly now when public support is sliding towards Trump’s loss by a significant margin.

Meanwhile, bravado and brinkmanship rule.

Bunn Nagara is Director and Senior Fellow at the Renaissance Strategic Research Institute, and Honorary Fellow at the Perak Academy. The views expressed here are solely the writer’s own.