AS Saudi Arabia prepared to host a summit of Gulf Arab leaders on April 28, political commentators in the neighbouring United Arab Emirates began furiously dropping hints online that major news was coming.
For weeks, Emirati officials had been openly expressing frustration with their Arab neighbours, complaining about their weak stance towards Iran, which had fired thousands of missiles and drones at Gulf countries in response to US and Israeli bombing.
Analysts wondered if the Emirates would demonstrate that displeasure at the summit.
Then, just as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman commenced the meeting, the Emirati government dropped a bombshell from hundreds of kilometres away: it announced that it was leaving Opec – a cartel of oil-producing countries that wields sway over global energy prices.
Emirati officials said they were doing so in order to unilaterally increase their oil production and meet the market’s long-term needs, but the fact that Opec’s de facto leader is Saudi Arabia was lost on no one in the region.
Whether the timing of the announcement was intentional or coincidental, it was a potent symbol of the recent tectonic shifts reshaping the Middle East, which have only accelerated during the conflict.
By pulling away from Opec, the Emirati government demonstrated that it is willing to make dramatic moves in its own interests and will not be constrained by traditional alliances and conventions.
“It is an Emirati declaration of independence,” said Kristin Diwan, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, a research organisation. “They no longer feel beholden to institutions that don’t align with their interests.”
The advent of an unbound Emirates has implications for markets, economies and conflicts around the world.
With more than US$2 trillion in sovereign wealth, the tiny country has cultivated influence far beyond its borders.
In an interview with The New York Times, UAE energy minister Suhail Al Mazrouei suggested that the decision to withdraw from Opec had “nothing to do with any specific producer”.
Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are “brothers”, standing together during the crisis caused by the conflict, he added.
Yet, it is undeniable that the Emirates – a major oil exporter and close US ally – has increasingly been going its own way in the region.
“What we’re seeing today is like a new UAE,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a prominent Emirati political scientist. “This is how the UAE will be behaving, and will be conducting itself regionally, globally.”
In recent years, Emirati officials have spoken of the importance of pursuing their own economic interests, chafing at quotas set by Opec that curtailed their oil production.
They have deepened their alliance with Israel, while other Arab governments keep their distance or pull further away from it.
In Yemen, the Emirates has supported an armed insurgency, angering Saudi leaders, who back the government there.
And in Sudan’s brutal civil war, where Saudi Arabia and Egypt support the government, the Emirates has backed a rival paramilitary group.
Emirati officials have denied sending weapons to the Sudanese group, the Rapid Support Forces, despite extensive evidence to the contrary.
The rift between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates has been developing for years and extends to the highest levels of the two governments.
Crown Prince Mohammed and Emirati leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan were once close partners, joining forces in 2015 to fight the Houthi rebels in Yemen, but they have since diverged significantly, pursuing different visions for the future of the Middle East that have come into conflict with each other.
That rupture burst into public view in December, but appears to have hardened during the conflict with Iran.
Since the US-Israeli assault began on Feb 28, Iran has directed the brunt of its retaliation at Gulf countries that host US military installations.
Instead of uniting the Gulf states against a common enemy, the Iranian attacks appear to have helped splinter the region.
As Gulf Arab officials weigh how to respond to Iran, the Emirates has taken measures to sever its long-standing cultural and economic ties with the country.
Saudi Arabia, which has faced fewer and less damaging attacks, has condemned Iran strongly, but supported efforts led by Pakistan to find a diplomatic resolution to the war – an initiative from which the Emirates has kept some distance.
Emirati officials have spoken repeatedly of their dissatisfaction with Arab and Islamic multilateral organisations, hinting that they would have preferred a stronger stance against Iran.
The Gulf countries are also reckoning with how to handle their relationship with the United States, which could not fully protect them from the barrage of Iranian attacks, despite being their main security guarantor for decades.
For years, oil policy has been a visible source of tensions between the Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
The Emirates appears to favour a strategy of maximising its oil production – in effect, selling as much of its oil as it can before energy markets move on from fossil fuels.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia generally seeks higher oil prices in the long term, a strategy that sometimes requires constraining the production of Opec members, including the Emirates.
A much larger and more oil-dependent country, Saudi Arabia needs higher revenue in order to fund its government budget, as well as the crown prince’s ambitious and expensive plans to turn the kingdom into a business and tourism hub.
Reflecting their government’s desire to chart its own course, Emirati officials and pro-government commentators have been speculating about what could come next.
Some say the Emirates could withdraw from the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council or the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, all of which are regional multilateral groups. — ©2026 The New York Times Company
This article originally appeared in The New York Times
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