For nearly five decades, the United States’ Taiwan policy has centred on strategic ambiguity by not declaring whether it would intervene militarily in a potential Taiwan conflict.
This policy – designed to deter Beijing from using force while preventing Taipei from formally declaring independence – is being challenged by realist US strategists amid a broader debate over America’s role in the world, growing constraints on US military might and a shifting regional balance of power driven by China’s military rise.
A small group of realist US strategists is pushing for the US to rule out military intervention over Taiwan to avoid the possibility of a catastrophic war between mainland China and the US. Experts said this idea, despite still being a minority view, was at least opening debate on the long-standing one-sided policy.
“When US officials first adopted strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, China’s military was no match for that of the US. This is no longer the case,” wrote Jennifer Kavanagh, director of military analysis at the Washington-based think tank Defence Priorities, in an opinion piece late last month.
“At the same time, the American military suddenly seems fragile, lacking the advanced munitions and naval forces it would need for a major power conflict and facing serious vulnerabilities in its basing infrastructure.
“Simply put, the US military remains the strongest in the world, but its ability to outlast China in a war over Taiwan is now in question.”
Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not formally recognise the island as independent, although Washington is committed to supplying it with defensive weapons and opposes any forcible takeover.
Kavanagh told the South China Morning Post on October 8 that of her many modelling efforts looking at what would be required to break through a blockade of Taiwan, the bottom line was that neither Beijing nor Washington could defeat the other side.
“The conflict would start with some kind of intense war. [In the modelling, the] US typically runs out of air-defence missiles and offensive missiles before China does, even if China depletes stockpiles,” she said.
“My assumption is that China blockades Taiwan and just bleeds it out. And there’s not so much the US can do.”
In a research report published on September 10, Kavanagh not only proposed ending strategic ambiguity over Taiwan but also argued for replacing US mutual defence treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia with narrower security partnerships.
The report also said the US should move most forces away from positions near mainland China in the first island chain – a string of US-led chokepoints along an arc of islands extending from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines – towards a smaller presence centred farther east around the second island chain, stretching from Japan through Guam to Papua New Guinea.
Her proposal drew strong pushback within US national security circles, was called a “bombshell” and “radical”, and was deemed to be Communist Party “talking points”.
“When I started arguing this, I was trying to be careful how I phrased what I was saying in the way that would make it clear that I was arguing for something that I thought was in US interests,” said Kavanagh, explaining how her position had become more direct since she first made the argument earlier last year.
“The US foreign policy is in a period of flux. And people are debating what the US role in the world should be.
“Being clear and direct about alternatives and options that the US has, and making a strong case for why this is in the US’ interest contributes to the debate.”
Kavanagh belongs to a school of foreign policy that rejects military interventionism in favour of military restraint, narrow national interests and a focus on domestic strength. Since last year, she has written several reports and published opinion pieces proposing a Taiwan non-intervention policy.
From the late 1990s until recently, a group of US foreign policy scholars and analysts has advocated restraint and argued that Taiwan’s importance does not justify risking a war with Beijing.
In 1998, Ted Galen Carpenter, now a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute and the Libertarian Institute, advocated continued arms sales but explicitly ruled out military intervention in a policy paper he wrote while at the Cato Institute, a Washington-based libertarian think tank. Doug Bandow, a Cato senior fellow, made a similar case in 2024.
In a 2015 paper, Charles L. Glaser, now a senior fellow at MIT’s security studies programme, proposed that Washington end its commitment to defend Taiwan in exchange for Beijing peacefully settling its maritime disputes and accepting a continued US military role in East Asia.
More recently, Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment’s American statecraft programme, argued in Foreign Affairs in February 2025 that Washington should prepare to stay out of a Taiwan conflict if the People’s Liberation Army did not attack US bases or warships.
In September 2025, Michael Swaine, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute, proposed a gradual transition to explicit non-intervention, emphasising the reassurance of allies and Beijing.
Swaine said that maintaining the possibility of the US intervening militarily would become increasingly dangerous and would risk a major war with China under a worsening strategic rivalry between the two powers.
He said there was an increasing tendency in Washington to regard Taiwan as a vital strategic location that, by implication, must be kept from Beijing. Alongside this, Beijing was steadily increasing its military capabilities regarding Taiwan.
“These two trends are increasing the likelihood of one or both sides taking what they view as deterrent actions that cross red lines, leading to a major crisis and possible conflict,” Swaine said.
“If these trends do not change, the US must consider just how vital Taiwan is to the US. Since I believe that it is in fact not a vital enough interest to justify risking a major war with China.”
Xin Qiang, deputy director of the Centre for American Studies at Fudan University, said the basis of strategic ambiguity stemmed from the extremely strong US military capability and its deterrent power, but the policy had become meaningless with the rise of Chinese military power.
But he said it would be difficult for this argument, which was still proposed by a minority voice, to become a mainstream view due to policy inertia.
“They’re actively debating it and it’s no longer just a one-sided policy position that leaves no room for discussion. The fact that this is happening is a good thing in itself, regardless of whether it will ultimately succeed,” Xin said.
The argument for policy change comes as US foreign policy is in a period of flux, with US President Donald Trump’s administration pushing the boundaries of what has long been status quo foreign policy.
Taiwan was among the most closely watched issues at the two summits between presidents Trump and Xi Jinping this year. While former US president Joe Biden repeatedly said the US would defend Taiwan in the event of a potential conflict, Trump has declined to say whether he would do so.
After the first summit in May, the US paused a US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which is still on hold. And the US is considering postponing the announcement of major arms sales to Taiwan until after November’s Apec summit in Shenzhen, the SCMP reported last month.
While he was silent on the Taiwan issue during the second summit last month, Trump raised the question after the meeting in Beijing in May of whether it would make sense for US forces to travel 9,500 miles (15,300km) to fight a war. -- SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
.
