Grow beyond labels

Regional power: Asean leaders at the opening ceremony of the 48th Asean Summit and Related Meetings, in Cebu, Philippines, in May. In South-East Asia, Asean is clearly a middle power within and beyond its region. — Reuters

SOME prominent roles countries play or are said to play can be elusive, illusory or simply mythical.

“Middle power” is a classic example. This term became fashionable after Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos speech about a ruptured global order requiring middle powers to awaken and reclaim their sovereignty. But as usual, the reality of getting from here to there can be murky or messy. Acquiring any power implies more than GDP status in global wealth rankings. It involves national capacity and will to enact policy that can impact distinctly on international affairs.

Becoming a middle power is not simply filling a space but serving a purposeful role. It is more than wearing a size M shirt. Middle powers are less than major powers but more than lesser powers. Does that sound comprehensible or of any use?

Sometimes a developing country is declared a middle power by others only because they find its policies agreeable, so it is complimented with empowerment. But that is not how countries become middle powers.

US-Israeli attacks on Iran made Iran stronger, more unified internally, more resilient regionally, and more influential globally with control over global oil supplies. Yet the collective West is loath to regard Iran as a middle power or anything more.

Objective terms are needed to gauge if a rising small power or declining great power has transitioned to middle power status. The four As criteria may apply: Agenda, agency, assertion and aspiration.

A country must first have a distinct agenda in respect of other countries. Without overt or covert purposefulness, its development as any type of power would be rudderless and inconsequential.

Sufficient agency as a middle power is also essential. Anything less would deny an opportunity for such a role. A middle power also needs to assert itself as such. A perpetually dormant middle power has no effective power.

A country must also want to be a middle power to become one. The role needs to be worked on voluntarily, not something an anointed country is simply appointed to by its friends and partners.

Beyond the four As criteria are more specific metrics like political resilience, economic strength, diplomatic clout, and military power. These are still not quantifiable since minimum qualifying levels vary between countries, and no universal standard applies.

In South-East Asia, Asean is clearly a middle power within and beyond its region. It possesses all the qualities in sufficient quantity, with Asean-led institutions like the Asean Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and the Regional Compre-hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) confirming its extra- regional stature.

Indonesia is the largest country in the region in its territory, population, and economy. It is also the only Asean country that is a full member of BRICS and the G20, while aspiring to join the OECD and assume a larger international role generally. Jakarta is heir to the ancient empires of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit, is Asean’s informal first among equals, and even aspires to be more than a middle power.

Singapore is small geographically but large as a trading hub and global financial centre, and in GDP per capita. Its status as a middle power is seldom discussed because it has no need for such speculation.

Malaysia is sometimes seen as a middle power, mostly by non- Malaysians. There are more tangible matters for Malaysians to attend to.

Malaysia has long portrayed itself as a small country with limited resources, and a developing nation steadily progressing towards fully developed status while prioritising peace, stability and prosperity. Its power ranking on some presumed global totem pole is not an outstanding concern.

Within Asean, Malaysia actively promotes regionalism for supranational interests. It pressed for Asean’s expansion to 10 members, then for Timor-Leste’s inclusion, while championing the ARF, EAS and RCEP as extra-Asean platforms. Malaysia operates within Asean norms as a filter for its foreign policy without striking out prominently on its own. Must these efforts, its rising standard of living, and endorsement of international law then make Malaysia a middle power?

The potential for middle powers, however defined, to nurture progressive policies existed before Carney’s speech and will remain after his words are forgotten. But middle powers are not necessarily virtuous or helpful as a corrective. Middle power status is neither the coveted pedestal it is presumed to be, nor a guarantor of national success and progress. It comes with global responsibilities, obligations, costs, and compromises that may be unwelcome.

A country that has what it wants without being tied to middle power status can escape the middle-power trap. Iran today is a middle power at least, but no other country would want to trade places with it.

Besides, would Carney’s proposed alliance of middle powers welcome as a member an Iran committed to global stability while resisting regime change by Western powers?

Bunn Nagara is director and senior fellow of the Renaissance Strategic Research Institute, and honorary fellow at the Perak Academy. The views expressed here are solely the writer’s own.