IN October 1986, at a two-day summit in the Icelandic capital of Reykjavik, US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev nearly struck an agreement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
The recent film The Brink of War revisits that extraordinary moment, showing two adversaries who recognised that nuclear war is unwinnable and that deterrence – relying on the threat of nuclear retaliation – was a perilous gamble with humanity’s future.
Today, that gamble is far more dangerous, and US Congress has not meaningfully examined it. It is also unclear what will really come out of the agreement made by US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin to open a dialogue on reducing the risks of nuclear weapons in Shenzhen on Thursday.
For eight decades, nuclear deterrence has served as the foundation of United States’ security policy. It is often described as sober, realistic, and time‑tested. But deterrence is not a law of nature. It is a theory built on assumptions about human behaviour, technology, and geopolitics that no longer match the world we live in.
Experts increasingly argue that the post-Cold War period, often perceived as stable, was actually an anomaly in which unusually strong buffers masked a brittle deterrence system that produced multiple near‑misses.
Those buffers are gone, and today’s destabilising technologies make the risks even greater. The near‑misses were warnings that the system was vulnerable even under ideal conditions.
Artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous weapons, cyber intrusions, hypersonic missiles, and weaponised satellites have transformed conflict escalation and decision-making. These technologies compress warning time and decision windows to minutes, not hours, increasing the risks of miscalculation.
The geopolitical landscape has also become increasingly unstable. Five of the world’s nine nuclear-armed states have engaged in warfare over the past year and a half. Two of them, the US and Russia, have made direct threats to use nuclear weapons.
While nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945, we must examine whether deterrence alone explains this outcome. Former US Defense secretary Robert McNamara identified a different reason: “We lucked out.”
Meanwhile, the US Government Accountability Office has repeatedly warned that cyber vulnerabilities in nuclear‑related systems remain insufficiently addressed. And the US is now advancing a nuclear modernisation effort that will lock in current assumptions for decades, without reviewing whether those assumptions remain sound.
Moreover, the expiration of New START (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in February 2026 left the US and Russia without legally binding limits on deployed strategic nuclear forces. Without verification, miscalculation becomes more likely and unconstrained arsenal expansion more plausible.
Despite all this, Congress has not held hearings that directly examine the risks and assumptions of nuclear deterrence or the viability of alternatives in decades.
The US Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees conduct annual reviews of nuclear programmes, but these hearings rarely question the underlying strategy. Nor do they examine false alarms, near‑misses, technological vulnerabilities or the ways AI and cyber warfare could undermine deterrence.
That makes it essential to understand why past efforts to reduce nuclear danger have failed – and what lessons they offer today.
The agreement at Reykjavik was prevented in large part by Reagan’s insistence that his Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”, as it was known) remain unconstrained, a position many observers believe blocked what could have been the most far-reaching nuclear disarmament agreement in history.
In retrospect, that outcome is particularly striking because the comprehensive missile shield Reagan envisioned was never demonstrated to be feasible, and its most ambitious goals were widely regarded as unworkable.
Today, a similar belief persists that missile defence technology will save us. Trump’s proposed Golden Dome missile defence system offers false security while accelerating arms production.
But the recently newly reconstituted US Congress offers fresh hope for change. A growing number of lawmakers are openly questioning deterrence and calling for a safer long‑term strategy.
Two resolutions, one in the House and the other in the Senate, outline a comprehensive nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda.
It may be more naive to believe deterrence will work forever than to believe disarmament is possible. No one is suggesting that eliminating nuclear weapons will be easy. But can we believe deterrence can keep us safe forever in a world defined by AI‑driven warfare, cyber vulnerabilities, and multipolar instability?
Reagan and Gorbachev understood something we have forgotten: Deterrence is not a destination. It is a temporary condition – one that becomes more fragile as technology accelerates and crises multiply.
Reykjavik showed that courage and imagination have the power to change the course of history. Congress should seize that clarity now – before our margin for error disappears. — Progressive Perspectives/Tribune News Service
Danny Hall is the lead Capitol Hill representative of the grassroots coalition Back from the Brink: Bringing Communities Together to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.
