WITH a tenuous two-week ceasefire in the war between the US and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is the centre of attention.
The Iranians are threatening to turn it into a permanent tollbooth, although they have agreed to allow some seaborne traffic – in “coordination” with their armed forces – while hostilities are temporarily suspended. US President Donald Trump says Tehran must reopen it permanently or face civilisational annihilation, and wants America’s European allies to take responsibility for the strait’s long-term future.
One way or another, the Strait of Hormuz will reopen to traffic. But returning to the pre-conflict status quo of unfettered passage is extremely unlikely. One forward-looking solution: an international naval coalition that would ensure freedom of navigation for commercial and military traffic.
The strait is a narrow 39km body of water bordered to the north by Iran and to the south by Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In normal times, about 20% of the world’s crude oil and petroleum products transit it each day, along with a similar level of natural gas and significant amounts of fertiliser and helium (the latter critical in the production of advanced microchips).
I have sailed through the strait dozens of times, and it is a tricky navigational passage even when you are not contending with mines, missiles, militarised small boats and deadly anti-ship drones. Its Traffic Separation Scheme – the chart-marked routing system to coordinate opposing traffic – is just two miles wide, with another mile of buffer zone between Iran and Oman at the narrowest part.
In the early 1980s, while studying international maritime law for a PhD at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, I focused on the legal nuances of this tiny body of water. These sorts of narrow passages are not international waters or high seas in the normal sense, because they fall inside the 22km territorial waters of the bordering states. But because the Strait of Hormuz connects two massive bodies of international waters – the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (via the Arabian Sea) – it creates an international right of “transit passage.”
This status allows ships of all nations to pass through, so long as they conduct “continuous and expeditious” navigation – no lingering in the territorial seas of the coastal nations or conducting offensive military operations.
Submarines, for example, may transit submerged (their “normal” mode) and surface ships can operate helicopters for surveillance and self-defence. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the coastal state cannot suspend transit for any reason.
Iran has now unilaterally claimed sovereign control over the strait and has been charging passage fees, placing mines to shepherd traffic closer to its shores, and mandating that Iranian forces be allowed to embark on ships in transit. None of that will ultimately be acceptable to the global community, especially the Gulf Arab states, which would become bottled up (even if they move ahead with various pipeline projects now being discussed). Iran’s contention will likely be that it isn’t among the 170 nations to ratify UNCLOS (neither is the US).
There are two paths forward. One is using US and Israeli military force to bludgeon Iran into compliance with global law. The other is a negotiated settlement between the combatants.
If negotiations over the strait fail, then forcing Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” as Trump puts it, would be a major endeavour. First would come a massive new bombing campaign; perhaps even Trump’s threatened strikes on the civilian energy grid and desalinisation plants, which would likely be war crimes.
The marine clearance operation itself would require 10 to 15 minesweeping/mine-hunting vessels, and a similar number of anti-mine helicopters. Protection would come from at least two squadrons of heavier warships (frigates, destroyers and high-speed patrol craft) and a constant presence of four to six fighters overhead. It could even entail a risky land operation involving Marines or paratroopers (there are around 10,000 in or headed to the Gulf now).
Using this ceasefire to reach a peaceful resolution would be far better than resorting to a military operation. But neither would be a lasting solution. Last Wednesday, Trump told Mark Rutte, secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato), that he wants the alliance to make commitments on reopening the strait “within days.” While the president is right about the urgency, Nato isn’t the relevant body to oversee a Middle Eastern waterway that provides an energy lifeline to nations in Asia and elsewhere.
A better idea is some sort of multinational “Strait of Hormuz Authority,” under the auspices of UNCLOS. It could be authorised by the International Maritime Organisation, the UN’s body that oversees the safety and security of shipping, and supported by a coalition of willing maritime states. The UK, where the IMO is headquartered, has already convened a conference involving more than 40 nations to discuss such an idea.
This would be a complicated and unique arrangement, and would require at least a dozen warships, including a large command-and-control vessel (perhaps a US or European big-deck amphibious assault ship) and smaller escorts with guided-missile systems for air defence.
Civilian ships could be assigned into convoys (as in the Suez Canal today) and then escorted through the waters by the warships. They would embark military and navigational personnel from the international coalition.
Geographically, a commercial ship would approach the strait from either the north (inside the Gulf) or the south in the Arabian Sea. There, it could check in with a zone-of-control command – likely operated in the central Persian Gulf by the Arab states, and at the southern entrance by a European-led naval force.
Once organised into convoys of six to eight civilian vessels, they would be given two or three warships for escort, including a large destroyer or cruiser, along with smaller frigates or corvettes. The north- and south-bound convoys would be coordinated to avoid clustering too many ships in the center of the strait.
The burden of operating such a scheme could be spread among not only the US and Europe, but also the nations that have the highest interest in reopening the passageway. This might involve warships from China (which gets 40% of its oil from the Gulf), India, Japan and South Korea – all of which have very capable navies.
Could Iran take part if a peace agreement were reached? Perhaps, although in this parlous moment that seems unlikely.
What if Trump refuses US involvement in an international coalition? The scheme would be vastly harder without US warships, intelligence and air power, but not impossible. American non-participation would deal yet another huge blow to US global leadership.
China would get a major geopolitical boost, along with a guaranteed supply of its petroleum lifeblood. It could even result in the end of global oil sales being priced in US dollars, and the creation of a “petroyuan.”
Creating a Strait of Hormuz Authority wouldn’t be easy or inexpensive. But developing a plan while the war continues is vital, so that it is ready for business when Iran reopens the strait, one way or another. — Bloomberg Opinion/TNS
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of Nato, and vice chairman at Carlyle.
