Japan, Taiwan, and the unraveling of the post-WWII order

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaishi’s recent remarks on Taiwan are not merely controversial; they strike at the heart of the post–World War II international order in Asia. By challenging the One-China policy, her comments implicitly question one of the foundational outcomes of Japan’s defeat in 1945 - that Taiwan, liberated from Japanese colonial rule, was returned to China.

This is not a semantic dispute. It is a direct challenge to the historical and legal settlement that underpinned peace in East Asia for decades.

More troubling still is what these remarks reveal about the worldview shaping Japan’s political right today. Takaishi does not speak in isolation. She represents a broader ideological current within Japan that seeks to relativise, sanitise, or outright deny the crimes of Imperial Japan. This revisionist impulse is deeply destabilising—not only for Japan’s neighbours, but for Japan’s own post-war identity as a peaceful state.

The symbolism of Takaishi’s actions matters. During her recent visit to Kuala Lumpur, she paid respects at a Japanese cemetery without expressing remorse for Imperial Japan’s atrocities across South-East Asia. For audiences in Tokyo, this may appear ceremonial or benign. For audiences in South-East Asia, it is anything but. In this region, World War II is not distant history. It is lived memory—passed down through families scarred by occupation, forced labour, massacres, and famine. The war remains an open wound, not a closed chapter.

Japan’s post-war rehabilitation in Asia was built painstakingly on economic cooperation, development assistance, and a commitment—however imperfect—to pacifism. That fragile trust can be eroded quickly when political leaders appear indifferent to historical responsibility. Silence, in this context, is not neutral. It speaks loudly.

Takaishi’s vision for Japan resembles a familiar political phenomenon elsewhere: a Japanese version of “Make America Great Again.” It is an attempt to reclaim national pride by romanticising a pre-1945 era of imperial power. Yet this nostalgia rests on a dangerous amnesia. Imperial Japan’s “greatness” was inseparable from colonial domination, military aggression, and immense human suffering across Asia. To seek restoration without reckoning is to repeat history’s most destructive mistakes.

This ideological turn does not exist in a vacuum. It is unfolding against a backdrop of profound global uncertainty. US isolationism—most clearly associated with the Trump era—has shaken the foundations of the alliance system that defined the post-war world. Allies accustomed to US security guarantees are reassessing their strategic options, often in destabilising ways. Japan is no exception.

Last week, the attack on Venezuela and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro signal a dramatic This unprecedented action, widely criticized as a violation of international law and Venezuelan sovereignty, highlights for state independence. The post-World War II order — once anchored by rules, institutions, and restraint — is visibly fraying.

But uncertainty does not justify militarisation. Japan’s response to a changing world will shape Asia’s future more than almost any other factor. The choice before Tokyo is stark: deepen diplomatic engagement and regional trust, or pursue remilitarisation and strategic assertiveness that will inevitably provoke fear.

History offers a clear lesson. For much of the post-war era, Japan exercised influence not through force, but through economic leadership. Japanese investment, technology, and development assistance played a crucial role in Asean’s growth and stability. This economic statecraft helped transform Japan from a former occupier into a valued partner. It was one of the most successful post-war transformations in modern history.

That legacy is now at risk.

A remilitarised Japan is deeply unsettling for South-East Asia. The memory of Japanese military power remains vivid, and reassurance cannot be achieved through rhetoric alone. Military expansion—no matter how it is framed—will be interpreted through the lens of history.

Even more alarming are discussions, however speculative, about Japan’s potential nuclear ambitions. Such a development would fundamentally undermine Asean’s long-standing efforts to preserve South-East Asia as a nuclear-free zone. It would accelerate regional arms competition, weaken non-proliferation norms, and erode decades of patient confidence-building.

Japan’s defenders often argue that today’s Japan is fundamentally different from Imperial Japan. This is true—but it is precisely why restraint matters. Post-war Japan earned regional respect by accepting the outcome of World War II, embedding pacifism into its constitution, and prioritising diplomacy over domination. To abandon these principles would not strengthen Japan’s security; it would weaken it.

The world is changing, and no country can afford strategic complacency. But adaptation does not require historical revisionism. On the contrary, navigating a more dangerous world demands greater honesty about the past, not less.

Japan faces a moment of choice. It can acknowledge the full consequences of its wartime actions and reaffirm its commitment to peace, cooperation, and international law. Or it can pursue a narrow nationalism that promises strength but delivers instability.

Japan has an important role to play in shaping a peaceful 21st-century world order—particularly in Asia, where power transitions are fraught and mistrust runs deep. That role will not be fulfilled through military expansion, nuclear ambiguity, or symbolic gestures that reopen old wounds.

A peaceful, self-aware Japan—anchored in accountability and regional partnership—is not a weakness. It is Japan’s greatest strategic asset. A remilitarised Japan, by contrast, risks becoming a source of fear rather than stability, suspicion rather than leadership.

The lessons of 1945 remain painfully relevant. Ignoring them would not make Japan great again. It would make the region less safe—and the future far more uncertain.

PETER T.C. CHANG

Research Associate, Malaysia-China Friendship Association,

Former Deputy Director, Institute of China Studies, Universiti Malaya