AFTER the war on Iran grew to include a war of narratives, it has now expanded further into a war of definitions.
Apart from relative strengths in the kinetic exchanges, how each side is seen is also important. Face, resoluteness and imperial pretensions matter in the battle for international public relations.
No country watching from a safe distance can approve of such a war. Countries close enough to be burnt are not neutral enough to deserve remaining unscathed.
As usual, the US-Israel tag team versus Iran has conditions for each side to fulfil.
Whether these conditions are actually met then becomes a yardstick for success or failure.
US demands have been hobbled from the start by a lack of clarity and an absence of realism. Trump moved the goalposts from stealing Iran’s enriched uranium, to regime change, to “bombing Iran back to the Stone Ages”.
As each task proved more formidable and out of reach, the next became even more ambitious and unreal. That was a course destined for expletive-laden posts on social media in place of policy, which duly occurred.
Israel’s goals were obvious enough: destroy Iran, assert regional dominance, and weaponise Trump’s administration for the tasks. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the trip to Washington to make all that happen.
Iran’s purpose was simple and straightforward but tougher – survive the attacks, and hold together with the physical integrity of any nation in repelling a war. That is still its purpose since a ceasefire is not a settled peace.
In contrast with vague, outlandish and shifting US demands, Netanyahu’s White House meeting with Trump was finely planned. It was called on Feb 11 to exclude two leading war sceptics, director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and Vice-President JD Vance when he was abroad.
What is the score after six weeks of war?
In late March Iran identified five conditions for genuine and lasting peace: a comprehensive halt to all violence; firm guarantees against future hostilities; ending all fighting regionwide including by allies; and acknowledgement of Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Payment of war reparations and an apology for attacking Iran were reportedly included.
Those at least were the terms of its opening offer.
By then, it was Israel’s turn to grow vague about its demands. That conveniently provides strategic ambiguity, useful for concealing its remaining outrageous purposes.
The US wanted to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment, even though Tehran is entitled to it for medical, scientific and other non-munitions purposes. Washington also insisted on maintaining its regional military dominion and Iran surrendering its control over the Hormuz Strait.
Outstanding differences clearly remained. That led to the next round of tough bargaining.
Feeling confident, Trump also wanted Iran to abandon its allies in the region and surrender even its non-nuclear missiles. Hopes for peace dimmed again.
Iran then spelt out 10 conditions that included ending Israeli attacks on Lebanon, lifting all sanctions on Iran, and continued Iranian management of transit through Hormuz.
Some US allies in the West also insisted that Lebanon must stay free of attacks. Trump at first agreed, then, after consulting Netanyahu, he reversed his decision and said a ceasefire would not include Lebanon. Israel drove the point home by bombing 100 targets in the country.
Iran resolved to maintain control of the Hormuz Strait, upsetting Trump, and the queue of ships awaiting permitted passage swiftly exceeded 600. Is there a ceasefire agreement in place, or even a ceasefire at all?
Regardless of which country actually wins this regional war in the end, Israel and the US have already lost the war for world opinion. Iran had been tricked twice into negotiations while they crept up to attack it from behind.
The next test of US strength, and Israeli capacity with it, will come 5,600km away in Beijing on May 14. Trump’s visit there has been postponed for 44 days because of the war, and the number may prove unlucky
for him.
Even without the war, Trump would have arrived in China as scheduled on March 31 ready to talk trade peace. His trade war stretching over three administrations, complete with punishing tariffs, was already winding down to an effective defeat.
A still unsettled war in Iran has weakened his capacity and resolve even further. China is
as aware as anyone else that Trump failed miserably to end the Ukraine war despite promising to do it “within 24 hours”, is failing in the Iran war, and has seen the trade war flop and backfire.
The next decisive point in mid-May in China could then set the stage for his administration’s fate for US mid-term elections this November. It will be watched keenly by many people everywhere, mostly in other countries.
Bunn Nagara is director and a senior fellow of the Renaissance Strategic Research Institute, and honorary fellow at the Perak Academy. The views expressed here are solely his own.
