Post-Johor extrapolations

IN political analysis, no one really has a crystal ball.

That said, even columnists have to eat, so here I am, offering some predictions and extrapolations about what is likely to come in the months ahead for Malaysian politics.

History suggests that Malaysian politics can in some ways be divided into two modes: when Barisan Nasional (BN) is dominant, and when it is not.

BN has been dominant for most of Malaysian history, and during this time, the biggest political conflict we have seen was Umno's internal conflicts.

The most obvious examples are between Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad and his deputies, notably Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah and Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim.

When Mahathir waged war against these two, the whole country shook. Indeed, the aftershocks and institutional changes that happened as a result of those conflicts are felt even today.

After 2008, BN was no longer dominant, and faced serious competition from the Opposition. This culminated in a change of government in 2018. During this period, the biggest political conflicts were between BN and Pakatan Harapan.

Coming back to the present day, following landslide victories for BN in both Melaka and Johor, will the primary arena of political conflict now swing back to being an internal Umno one?

I suppose this depends on how strong or weak the Opposition will be.

The history of said Opposition may provide some answers to that question. I won’t go as far back as Gagasan Rakyat and Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah during Tengku Razaleigh’s time, but we can start making some observations from the very first coalition that resembles today’s Opposition, Barisan Alternatif; then we can work our way up to Pakatan Harapan as we know it today. Think of it as an Opposition highlight reel.

In 1999, Keadilan (then Parti Keadilan Nasional), PAS and DAP announced an electoral pact which featured straight fights in every seat, and even a joint manifesto, under the name Barisan Alternatif.

Long story short, in this Reformasi era, PAS benefitted considerably from this pact (going from seven to 27 parliamentary seats) while DAP went from seven to 10 seats, but with Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh losing. Keadilan won five seats.

This coalition proved to be unstable, rocked as it was by debates around Islamic statehood and other controversies. After the Sept 11, 2001 attacks, DAP announced that it was pulling out of Barisan Alternatif.

When it came to the 2004 elections, the coalition had essentially fallen apart, straight fights were no longer guaranteed, and many seats saw multi-cornered fights.

PAS dropped back from 27 to only seven seats, DAP increased from 10 to 12, and the renamed Parti Keadilan Rakyat (after its 2003 merger with Parti Rakyat Malaysia) dropped to only one seat. BN won a whopping 90% of all parliamentary seats.

As an aside, it was not long after this that I started working in politics (with the quixotic one-seat party).

In the run-up to the 2008 General Election, the Opposition learned from past mistakes, and was once again able to secure one-on-one fights against BN.

That year was dubbed a "political tsunami". PAS went from seven to 23 seats, DAP from 12 to 28, and PKR from one to 31. It was by far the biggest Opposition victory at that point, denying BN a two-thirds majority for the first time ever, something virtually unimaginable previously.

After such big gains, the Opposition decided to formalise the pact as a newly-branded coalition: Pakatan Rakyat. It was a heady time, and I had some small part in helping with its first common document.

Excitement going into the 2013 general election was palpable. I believe the phrase du jour was “Ini kalilah!” (This time for sure!)

Alas, it was not to be. Pakatan Rakyat increased its total seats from 82 to 89, with all gains accounted for by DAP, which went from 28 to 38. PKR and PAS actually lost seats: from 31 to 30 for PKR, and 23 to 21 for PAS.

Numerically speaking, this surely would not count as any sort of major loss.

But given how high expectations ran at the time, it was seen as a huge disappointment – and it eventually was the beginning of the end for Pakatan Rakyat.

The 2014 Kajang Move was something of a nail in that particular coffin. PKR’s insistence on removing Abdul Khalid Ibrahim as Selangor mentri besar also alienated PAS and created strong internal strife.

In the end, the instigators scored a massive own goal when their enemy Datuk Seri Azmin Ali was installed as Selangor MB instead of their preferred candidates.

One could argue that this set in motion the chain of events that allowed Azmin to become such a powerful politician.

In June 2015, DAP secretary-general Lim Guan Eng declared that Pakatan Rakyat was no more.

We can interpret this as the balance of power shifting back into BN’s favour, emboldening then prime minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak.

Najib’s overconfidence led to increased opposition from Mahathir and Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, culminating in yet another of Umno’s famous breakaway parties, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu).

After some "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" negotiations, Bersatu even made a new pact with PKR and DAP, thus forming Pakatan Harapan (PH).

PAS’ ultimate decision to thre-corner both BN and PH in the 2018 General Election paved the way for our first ever non-BN government.

There was euphoria in the air. People spoke of "Malaysia Baru" (a new Malaysia), and I finally felt I could wear a Bersih T-shirt to One Utama.

Less than two years later, it all came crashing down. Much and more has been said about why; I won’t repeat it here.

Suffice to say that, amidst competing pressures and a lack of true bonds among those who had swept to power, the centre did not hold.

Muhyiddin became PM, but he too ultimately could not hold the centre – especially in the face of perceived poor handling of Covid-19.

Which brings us to today’s ‘"compromise" Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Sabri Yaakob, whose Federal Government is held together by support primarily from Umno, Bersatu and PAS, and of course parties from Sabah and Sarawak.

We have now had two state elections, in Melaka and Johor, which show an undeniable resurgence in support for BN.

In both elections, there were three main coalitions: BN, PH and Perikatan Nasional (which consists primarily of Bersatu, PAS and Gerakan).

So in 1999, we had a united Opposition; in 2004, a fractured one; in 2008 a united one; in 2013, the same united one; and in 2018, technically, a fractured one.

In 2018, as it happens, a fractured Opposition likely drew votes away from BN.

In Melaka and Johor, however, it feels like the fractured Opposition split votes among itself.

I wouldn’t dare to predict what would happen with a fractured Opposition in GE15.

Regardless, rhyming history suggests that PH and PN will read the writing on the wall in Melaka and Johor, and eventually close ranks to try for one-on-one fights against BN.

Trying to do so will of course be awkward. No one in PH will ever forget what Muhyiddin did during the Sheraton Move; no one in PAS will ever forget Parti Amanah Negara’s (Amanah) perceived betrayal.

But just because no one has forgotten doesn’t mean that political expediency will not ultimately be the key determining factor again, just like it has in the countless examples above.

My prediction is that the electoral maths will again be the biggest influencing factor, and that it is more likely than not that PH and PN will form some sort of electoral pact moving towards GE15, instead of deciding to three-corner against each other again.

The only questions are what degree of political contortions, twisting and turning will be required to justify this alliance; and whether or not the coalition that emerges as a result will inspire confidence in voters or invite cynicism.

In terms of historical comparisons, the next general election is starting to look the most like 2004, where DAP will probably emerge as the strongest by far (although a fat lot of good that does them), PKR may be at its nadir, with BN poised to easily regain a two-thirds majority.

The big difference of course is that in 2004, there was the promise of fresh new leadership under Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, whose softer style stood in great contrast to Mahathir’s dictator reputation.

Abdullah was Mahathir’s anointed successor, and faced no challengers.

Ismail Sabri is in the completely opposite scenario. He was more of a compromise pick than anyone’s hand-picked successor, and he has not demonstrated the kind of cutthroat heavy-handed politics that inspire fear among his detractors.

What he does face is the Najib and Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi faction, who are likely coming at him in full force hoping to restore their grip on power and escape their courtroom fates.

While the Opposition continues its existential struggle, likely too range-bound by entrenched culture and thinking to produce anything that is truly fresh, disruptive and innovative, it is likely that the biggest political conflict to come will be to determine who BN’s next candidate for PM will be.

The controversy surrounding the appointment of the Johor Mentri Besar has shown us that this is a battle with many unpredictable twists and turns.

NATHANIEL TAN is a strategic communications consultant. Twitter: @NatAsasi, Email: [e-mail]. #BangsaMalaysia #NextGenDemocracy.