How industry players influence government regulators 


There are a number of ways in which industry players can exert influence over the government agency that is suppose to regulate it. — Vecteezy

George J. Stigler was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1982 for his “seminal studies of industrial structures, functioning of markets, and causes and effects of public regulation”, according to the Nobel Prize website.

His paper, The Theory of Economic Regulation, was published in the Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science in 1971.

Stigler wrote: “A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”

Imagine that the government is considering passing or imposing certain regulations or policies.

The question is, who has the incentive to expend large amounts of money, time and attention focused on every clause of these regulations or policies?

Stigler pointed out that politics and behind-the-scenes lobbying will play a big role in this process.

This can lead to regulatory capture, which is when industry interests dominate the regulatory agency that is suppose to protect the public interest.

How they act

Regulatory capture can occur through financial incentives, career mobility and intellectual influence.

However, its pathways are subtler, diffuse and more varied than most people assume.

Regulatory capture has been facilitated by politics.

Politicians support their campaigns through donations in many countries.

This practice enables various groups to engage in lobbying and pursuance of rent-seeking activities.

Some healthcare suppliers may aim to obtain favourable conditions from policymakers.

They may directly influence regulations or policies that not only benefit their own interests, but also put their competitors at a disadvantage.

As the regulated industry possesses informational advantages, they are able to act opportunistically.

They can transmit self-serving information when regulators outsource expertise to them to develop standards, compliance and audit requirements, as well as taxonomy rules, e.g. defining what is “green” etc, which raises the barrier for new entrants and protects incumbents.

A common pathway is the revolving door where there is movement of personnel from regulatory agencies to and from the industries the agencies regulate.

This can lead to conflicts of interest.

When regulators leave a regulatory agency for positions in regulated private sector companies, it raises questions about the integrity of their prior oversight or vice versa. 

Revolving doors transform independent oversight into a collaborative partnership.

Another pathway is that of cultural or cognitive capture, which is subtle and insidious.

The ostensible informal relationships between regulators and various stakeholders, where a particular worldview is subtly ingrained, ultimately leads to more favourable regulations or policies for the industry.

The funding of select scientific studies, and the inclusion of lobbyists on scientific and ethics committees, serves to sway decision-makers.

An example is the US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) relationship with the pharmaceutical industry in which user fees, paid by the industry to fund the review of new drug applications, generates a majority of the US FDA’s Human Drugs programme budget.

The expansion of regulatory power through “mission creep” with the raising of new threats or issues that need to be regulated, is another bureaucratic growth strategy.

The increase in regulatory complexity not only benefits bureaucracies, but also benefits the private entities that capitalise on it.

Politicians can also capture regulation to reinforce their power.

Political entrepreneurs can threaten others with regulation to extract rents. 

The public ultimately bears the costs of regulatory capture.

As it is not a large amount when spread out per person, this creates a strong disincentive for the public to counter-lobby.

Compared to the public, organised lobbies have far lower organisational costs relatively.

The revolving door

Genevieve Kanter and Daniel Carpenter’s article, Revolving Door in Health Care Regulation, reviewed the appointments to the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the healthcare regulator in the United States between 2004 and 2020.

They found that 15% had been employed in private industry immediately before their appointment.

At the end of their tenure, 32% exited to industry.

The greatest net exits to industry were from the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the US Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).

The HHS offices with the highest rates of net exits to industry, i.e. exits minus entries, included the CDC, the Office of the Deputy Secretary, the CMS and the FDA.

At the CDC, although only 8% of appointees came from industry, 54% exited to industry positions.

More than half of the appointees at the CDC, CMS and the Office of the Deputy Secretary exited to industry.

The authors concluded: “The sheer scale of the revolving door that we have identified, however, is troubling and merits further scrutiny.

“The risks posed to the functioning of and public trust in HHS warrants study into how these government-industry flows are affecting agency decision- making, especially in offices with the highest net exit rates.

“Where there exist vulnerabilities, analysis can focus on how current laws and regulations can be refined or better enforced.

“Given the complexity and subtlety of mechanisms of industry influence, regulation of the revolving door will require innovative legal and regulatory strategies.”

Influencing drug prices

Access to medicines has been an issue in India, with regulatory capture in the domestic market.

The mechanisms concern the regulation of medicine prices, which was prey to industry influence; regulation of the therapeutic relevance of drugs; and the regulation of clinical trials.

A study by Oxfam India titled Regulatory Capture and Access to Healthcare: India Case Study, published in 2017, showed how instances of regulatory capture were embedded in the economic system.

The authors concluded that regulatory capture by the industry “both domestic and foreign, has largely nullified the possible benefits of regulations of the medicines market.

“Regulatory capture in India is also exercised at the level of public policy with the adoption of neoliberal reforms which places the interest of industry over public health.

“The impact of neoliberal reforms also extends to continued stagnation of investment in public health, thus compounding the problem of compromised access to medicines for poor patients”.

Ethical and moral questions

Ethical questions of regulatory capture include:

  • Fairness: How can regulators be fair to all stakeholders, particularly the public, if they are influenced by the interests of those whom they have to regulate?
  • Accountability: How can regulators be held accountable for actions that do not protect the public interest if they are obligated to those whom they regulate?
  • Transparency: How can interactions between regulators and industry be transparent to maintain public trust and prevent corruption?
  • Public trust: How can the public trust the government when regulations or policies are perceived to favour special interests?
  • Governmental action: How can regulatory bodies be designed to include institutional safeguards and transparency mechanisms to insulate regulators from undue political or financial influence so that public trust is protected?

The consequences of regulatory capture in healthcare are diminished safety standards, higher costs and reduced access to care.

Patients may be exposed to defective or dangerous medicines and/or medical devices, delayed or denied treatments, and increased insurance premiums.

It also undermines public trust in healthcare facilities and government agencies.

Regulatory capture can be reduced by structural safeguards, like ensuring independence of the regulator/policymaker, transparent decision-making, and simplified regulatory/policy frameworks that limit external influence.

The strengthening of oversight, strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules, limiting revolving- door employment, and ensuring transparency in research funding, are also crucial.

Dr Milton Lum is a past president of the Federation of Private Medical Practitioners Associations and the Malaysian Medical Association. For more information, email starhealth@thestar.com.my. The views expressed do not represent that of organisations that the writer is associated with. The information provided is for educational and communication purposes only, and it should not be construed as personal medical advice. Information published in this article is not intended to replace, supplant or augment a consultation with a health professional regarding the reader’s own medical care. The Star disclaims all responsibility for any losses, damage to property or personal injury suffered directly or indirectly from reliance on such information.

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Healthcare , governance , lobbyists

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