THIS may turn out to be one of the most consequential corporate scandals in history.
Artificial intelligence (AI)-related stocks in both the United States and China came under heavy selling pressure in the middle of November following Jensen Huang’s abrupt departure as Nvidia chief executive officer (CEO) on Nov 12, as investors reassessed the implications for the global AI investment cycle.
Colette Kress, Nvidia’s chief financial officer, has been appointed interim CEO while the company searches for a permanent successor.
On a personal note, I feel saddened by his departure.
Perhaps it is partly because, as someone of Chinese heritage, I have always taken pride in his remarkable achievements and contributions to the semiconductor industry and, more recently, the AI revolution.
Having read the book “The Nvidia Way” earlier this year, my biggest takeaway is that Nvidia’s extraordinary success was the product of both fortunate timing and Huang’s exceptional leadership.
Nvidia was never destined to become the world’s leading AI chipmaker.
Its journey was marked by several near-death experiences, bold technological bets and unexpected opportunities.
What distinguished Nvidia was Huang’s ability to recognise these opportunities, make difficult decisions and turn technological breakthroughs into commercial success.
To me, Jensen Huang is Nvidia. His ability to bring suppliers, customers, capital providers and engineers together around a vision of the future that had yet to materialise is almost impossible to replicate.
His influence extends well beyond Nvidia.
In many ways, he has been one of the most important architects of the global AI ecosystem, connecting technological innovation with the capital investment needed to bring it to scale.
From a macroeconomic perspective, however, the bigger concern goes beyond Nvidia’s corporate future.
A US–China technology relationship without Huang could become considerably more complicated.
Huang has arguably been the industry’s most influential advocate against increasingly restrictive US chip export controls.
His argument was not simply about protecting Nvidia’s commercial interests.
He has maintained that denying Chinese companies access to American technology could ultimately accelerate China’s efforts to develop its own semiconductor ecosystem, potentially undermining US technological leadership over the longer term.
His departure therefore removes an important voice advocating continued technological engagement between the world’s two largest economies.
The timing is particularly sensitive, coming just days before the confirmed meeting between US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen.
One immediate risk is renewed political momentum behind the Remote Access Security Act.
The proposed legislation would strengthen the US Commerce Department’s authority to regulate remote access to controlled technologies, potentially extending export restrictions beyond physical chip shipments to cloud-based computing services.
The Bill passed the House of Representatives by an overwhelming 369–22 vote on Jan 12, 2026, and was subsequently referred to the Senate Banking Committee, where it has yet to receive a vote.
Nvidia has reportedly lobbied against the legislation.
The implications could extend well beyond the United States and China.
A Reuters report on Nov 12 highlighted how Chinese AI companies were seeking overseas computing capacity, particularly in Asean, amid concerns that the controversy surrounding Huang could accelerate US legislative efforts to restrict remote access to advanced AI chips.
This creates a new layer of geopolitical risk for Asean’s rapidly expanding data centre (DC) industry.
Singapore and Malaysia, in particular, have benefitted from strong investment in AI infrastructure and growing demand for computing capacity.
However, if US export controls are extended to overseas cloud access, DC projects serving Chinese customers could face greater regulatory uncertainty, potentially affecting utilisation rates, contracted revenues and investment returns.
For banks financing these projects, the implications are equally important.
DC financing backed by Chinese anchor tenants could face higher refinancing, counterparty and covenant risks, particularly where project economics depend heavily on continued access to US-controlled AI hardware and computing services.
What initially appears to be a US corporate governance crisis could therefore have wider implications for credit risk and capital allocation across Asia.
There is, however, another side to the story.
Over the medium term, Huang’s departure could paradoxically accelerate China’s push for technological self-reliance.
If Chinese policymakers and technology companies conclude that access to US computing infrastructure is becoming increasingly uncertain, they may have even stronger incentives to accelerate domestic investment in AI chips, semiconductor manufacturing, software ecosystems and alternative computing architectures.
The controversy could also influence global talent flows.
Rising geopolitical uncertainty and tighter restrictions on technological collaboration may encourage more Chinese engineers and researchers working overseas to return to China, potentially reinforcing the country’s domestic innovation ecosystem.
This brings us back to one of the central lessons I took from “The Nvidia Way”.
Technological leadership is not determined by hardware alone. It also depends on vision, talent, execution and the ability to build an ecosystem around a common technological platform.
Huang’s departure may weaken one of the most important bridges between the United States and Chinese AI ecosystems.
But it could also strengthen China’s determination to build an alternative ecosystem of its own.
The longer-term consequence may therefore be not a slowdown in the global AI race, but an acceleration of technological fragmentation, with two increasingly distinct AI ecosystems competing for capital, talent and market share.
Several developments will be worth monitoring over the coming weeks, particularly the APEC meeting, the Senate Banking Committee’s invitation for Huang to testify on Dec 3, and its request for Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to appear on Dec 10.
Lutnick has agreed to appear voluntarily, while Huang’s attendance has not been confirmed at the time of writing.
The question is no longer simply who will succeed Huang at Nvidia. It is whether the global AI ecosystem he helped build can continue to thrive in an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment.
