Green push will make world more dangerous

In transition: A mother pushes a stroller in front of a power station in Germany. The world is entering a messy period, in which rivalry over sources of renewable energy will steadily intensify, even as older clashes over oil and other hydrocarbons continue to play out. — AP

THINK a green transition will free America from high-stakes competition over energy supplies? Think again.

Since the Industrial Revolution, changing patterns of energy consumption have propelled international conflict.

Today, the world is entering a very messy period, in which rivalry over sources of renewable energy will steadily intensify, even as older clashes over oil and other hydrocarbons continue to play out.

Energy is the lifeblood of civilisation: Since the early 1800s, access to coal, oil and other resources has driven economic prosperity and military power. The struggle over energy is, in many ways, the story of modern geopolitics.

In the 19th century, coal was king, so the great empires sought colonies and other territories with rich reserves; they clashed for control over oceanic coaling stations that were the infrastructure of overseas trade and global power projection.

In the 20th century, oil displaced coal, and oil-producing regions, from the Middle East to the Caucasus to the Dutch East Indies, became key strategic prizes in two world wars and the Cold War that followed.

US President Joe Biden’s administration is now calling for a green revolution, in part because of accumulated fatigue from America’s role as guardian of the Persian Gulf. But don’t except the deeper pattern to change anytime soon.

For one thing, energy transitions don’t happen quickly or cleanly: Older models of power generation typically persist even as newer models emerge.

The shocks caused by the Ukraine war remind us that global oil dependence isn’t going away anytime soon, and neither will the quest for influence in the regions that produce that vital resource.

If anything, the Middle East is becoming more contested, as China invests heavily in Saudi Arabia and other oil monarchies, seeks to build military bases, and develops a blue-water fleet necessary to ensure that Washington can’t simply starve Beijing of energy imports in a crisis.

As much as the United States wants out of the Middle East, its primary great-power challenger wants in.

Meanwhile, the clash over renewable energy resources is just getting started. Solar panels and wind turbines are built with aluminum, copper, silver, silicon and other materials. Cobalt, lithium and manganese are vital components of electric vehicle batteries.

In a fragmenting international system, competition over the resources that will ultimately power the 21st-century economy could be just as vicious as the fights over oil in the 20th.

The world’s great powers will have a strong rooting interest in civil wars and political contests in resource-rich countries, just as the US has long deemed the political stability of Saudi Arabia to be vital to its security.

Large states will seek to ensure, whether commercially or militarily, the security of their supply chains while perhaps developing the ability to fracture those of their rivals. It’s happening already.

China, which has long pursued loans-for-resources deals in developing countries, is investing heavily in production of methanol and other non-traditional fuels at home, while paying close attention to sources of renewable energy abroad.

Beijing is seeking greater control over global lithium supplies, in part through investments in mining and production in Chile and other South American countries.

China has also made a priority of accessing the Democratic Republic of Congo’s world-leading cobalt reserves. By one estimate, Chinese companies own or help fund 15 out of 19 cobalt mines in that country.

These acquisitions are part of what US officials have described as a larger, integrated strategy from Beijing that emphasises securing the infrastructure – especially ports and railroads – that are needed to move resources to the sea and then to China.

It also involves the military deployments and logistical facilities – some shrouded in mystery – needed to ensure that China can protect its investments and extend its global reach.

The US isn’t particularly well positioned for this challenge. Part of the problem, as President Donald Trump’s administration catalogued, is that America relies on China for many minerals deemed critical to US interests.

Then there is the fact that Washington just hasn’t prioritised many of the key countries and regions.

South America and Africa loom large; South-East Asian countries have lots of nickel. Beijing has consistently expanded its influence in these regions.

American engagement has been far more episodic and reactive – in military, diplomatic and economic terms – because Washington has simply been focused on other things.

The US is trying to catch up, by seeking greater access to key resources in allied countries (such as Australian cobalt); stimulating domestic extraction and production; exploring cobalt-free batteries and other alternatives; and working with allies and private companies to provide developing countries with options other than relying on Chinese financing, investment and infrastructure deals.

But many of these efforts are nascent at best, and the momentum appears to be on Beijing’s side.

The world’s new energy competition is heating up, not least in regions that the US has become accustomed to treating as strategic afterthoughts. If history is any guide, it won’t have that luxury for long. — Bloomberg

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. The views expressed here are the writer’s own.