Even as Congress remains divided over the latest US defence bill, lawmakers in both parties remain united on one issue: China.
The National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA), which sets US defence policy and authorises military spending each year, reflects a broad bipartisan consensus on expanding Washington’s military, technological and economic rivalry with Beijing.
While the House and Senate versions differ on a number of provisions, both include new measures on Taiwan, artificial intelligence, defence supply chains and preparations for a potential South China Sea crisis, underscoring how competition with Beijing has become embedded throughout US national security policy.
The House has already passed its version of the financial year 2027 NDAA, while the Senate is struggling to approve its own before next week’s August recess. The two chambers will then have to reconcile their differences before sending the legislation to US President Donald Trump for his signature.
This year’s tone is largely the same as in past bills, experts say, though with notable new additions targeting China across a wide range of issues, from defence procurement and supply chains to artificial intelligence, industrial policy and economic security.
Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific programme, said the NDAA had increasingly been used to bolster resilience against China while strengthening defence ties with allies and partners.
“Over the past decade, Congress has increasingly used the NDAA to emphasise strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” she said, pointing out that the bill is especially aimed at “enhancing resilience against Chinese coercion, [and] enhancing Taiwan’s readiness and resilience”.
Taiwan and the US ‘war reserve’
Taiwan remains a feature of both versions of the NDAA, with the Senate version taking a stronger focus amid the potential for conflict with Beijing.
The Senate bill would establish a “War Reserve Stock Programme” for Taiwan – perhaps the provision to anger Beijing the most – authorising the pre-positioning of humanitarian supplies, ammunition, missiles and other military equipment to improve the island’s readiness in the event of a conflict.
“[The bill] marks the first time Congress is proposing the provision of direct statutory authority for such a programme, moving from a planning requirement to an operational capability,” Glaser said.
While the NDAA does not alter the long-standing US “one China” policy, she added, it reflects a clear bipartisan consensus that improving Taiwan’s ability to deter aggression is central to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing views Taiwan as part of China to be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington opposes any attempt to change the status quo by force and is committed to supplying the island with defensive weapons.
Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said the programme reflects an effort to help both Washington and Taipei better prepare “for a long-term conflict that would require deep war reserves.”
The Senate version would also extend and redesignate the “Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative” as the “First Island Chain Security Cooperation Initiative”, with the Philippines added to receive military support under the programme.
The Chinese embassy in Washington issued a sharply worded statement that China “strongly deplores and firmly opposes” these NDAA provisions, and any attempt to arm Taiwan “will face grave consequences”.
“The Taiwan-related provisions in the bill grossly interfere in China’s internal affairs, gravely undermine China’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, seriously disrupt peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and send a profoundly wrong signal to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and the outside world,” the embassy spokesperson said in a statement.
The statement singled out named Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te, arguing the real threat to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait comes from his administration’s “Taiwan independence” separatist activities and interference by external forces.
“[The] Taiwan question allows no external interference, and China’s red lines must not be crossed,” the statement continued.
“The so-called enhancement of Taiwan’s defence capabilities will only embolden ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists, expose the people in Taiwan to the dangers of a powder keg, push the Taiwan Strait into a perilous situation, and inevitably heighten the risk of conflict and confrontation between China and the United States.”
Taiwan is the “most important” issue in Beijing’s relations with Washington, Chinese President Xi Jinping told Trump in May.
And any perceived provocation – whether an arms sale approval or an initiative like the war reserve programme – could complicate preparations for Xi’s planned state visit to Washington this autumn.
Trump has separately paused a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, a move unrelated to the NDAA process but one that underscores how carefully the administration is managing the relationship ahead of Xi’s visit.
Supply chains and AI competition
One of the clearest themes in both versions of the NDAA is reducing the Pentagon’s reliance on Chinese products and suppliers.
A House Armed Services Committee fact sheet says the legislation seeks to “remove China from our defence supply chains”.
The House bill would prohibit the Department of Defence from acquiring Chinese-made humanoid robotic systems, photovoltaic cells, solar modules and inverters, as well as used sealift vessels built in China.
The House bill also includes workforce development initiatives to support the mining of critical minerals, aimed at reducing dependency on China.
The Senate bill would require an annual assessment of how advanced AI chips contribute to China’s military capabilities, and would prohibit defence contractors from sharing sensitive synthetic biology information with China.
Both versions seek to ban the use of Chinese-manufactured optical fibre and connected vehicles.
Cooper said the most consequential China-related provisions right now are the bills aimed at preventing China from acquiring advanced artificial intelligence chips, cloud compute and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
It remains unclear whether those export-control measures will survive into the final, reconciled version of the bill, he said, “but there is momentum in that direction”.
The Senate bill also includes a prohibition on Pentagon funding for film, television or other entertainment projects tied to the Chinese state.
Other provisions would strengthen research security and seek to prevent sensitive technologies from benefiting China’s military, including restrictions on collaboration with Chinese academic institutions and new “insider threat reporting” requirements for large AI contractors.
The Pentagon has also blacklisted several China-military-linked companies, triggering strong opposition from Beijing, which called Washington’s move an “overstretching” of the concept of national security and its use of “discriminatory lists” targeting Chinese businesses.
Some companies on the list, including Alibaba, have since sued the Department of Defence, seeking removal.
Alibaba owns the South China Morning Post.
South China Sea issue makes a comeback
The South China Sea may have drawn less attention in the halls of Congress than it did a decade ago, but the Senate version of the bill would require the Pentagon, within a year, to draft a crisis strategy for the sea identifying likely flashpoints and outlining phased response plans coordinated with federal agencies and foreign partners.
Evan Sankey, a fellow at the Cato Institute, said he was surprised by the provision.
“Ten years ago you heard a lot about the island-building in the South China Sea, and there was a lot of policy talk in the US over what to do about it,” Sankey said. “That issue has sort of fallen off.”
China’s “nine-dash line” claims overlap with the maritime claims of Vietnam, the Philippines and other South China Sea claimant states.
The disputes involve access to fishing grounds, potential oil and gas reserves, and strategic shipping lanes.
China also rejected a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal that was in favour of Manila, arguing that the ruling is “illegal” and the court did not have jurisdiction over sovereignty issues.
In July, the United States, Japan and the Philippines conducted joint military exercises and maritime drills aimed at strengthening regional security cooperation, moves Beijing said would “damage regional peace and stability”.
The same month, the US and its allies also concluded Rimpac, the world’s largest multinational maritime exercise, widely seen as reinforcing deterrence against China amid growing regional tensions.
The Senate bill also expands regional programmes beyond China-specific measures, deepening military partnerships with the Philippines and Australia and assessing Japan’s defence capabilities – an apparent move to boost the US’ Indo-Pacific presence and alliances.
Overall, Sankey said the NDAA sticks to its standard line on China: that Beijing is “a strategic competitor” with “ambitions to dominate Asia”.
The Senate has yet to begin debating the NDAA after Democrats blocked a procedural vote. A motion to reconsider remains pending. Sankey said he does not expect the NDAA to languish.
“Congress has a tendency to drag its feet on lots of stuff,” Sankey said. “But when it comes to the Pentagon, there will be pressure to get to pass something and get it signed by the president.” -- SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
