The Iran conflict is pushing Saudi Arabia to reconsider its US-led security strategy, with China emerging to play a limited, but functional role, analysts say.
However, deep US ties in defence would restrict Saudi Arabia’s broader cooperation with China, they added, as one expert predicted Riyadh was likely to deepen ties with regional powers such as Pakistan and Turkey.
In a rare alignment, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, a key US ally in the Middle East, initiated a phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Monday.
He said Riyadh was ready to strengthen communication and coordination with China to “prevent the resurgence of hostilities, ensure the safety and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and work together to find solutions for long-term regional stability and security”.
During the phone conversation, Xi said for the first time that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open, adding that it aligned with the “common interest of countries” in the region and the international community, according to state news agency Xinhua.
Xi also said China stood ready to work with Saudi Arabia to “deepen strategic mutual trust, enhance practical cooperation, expand exchanges at all levels and continue to broaden and deepen the scope of bilateral ties”.
Since the US-Israeli military strikes on Iran began on February 28, Tehran has retaliated with missile and drone attacks on key Saudi infrastructure – including energy production and refining facilities – as it seeks to punish US allies in the Gulf.
Saudi state news agency SPA said on April 9 that attacks on the kingdom’s energy facilities had reduced its oil production capacity by around 600,000 barrels per day.
For Saudi Arabia, the prolonged conflict amplifies regional instability and underscores its vulnerability, with Iran posing a security threat and Israel’s growing military assertiveness seen as a long-term destabilising factor.
For decades, Middle Eastern oil powers have tied their security closely to the US. Now, caught between Washington and Tehran, Riyadh may shift towards self-reliance and diversifying partnerships, observers say.
Gu Dingguo, deputy director of the Shanghai Counterterrorism Research Centre, said the US-Iran war had shattered America’s security guarantees, creating an opening for China and the Gulf nations to strengthen ties.
The attacks revealed that the US could not effectively shield Saudi Arabia; on the contrary, its actions had, to some extent, become a triggering factor for Iran’s attacks against Saudi Arabia, he said.
“Can China become a security partner for Saudi Arabia? The answer is yes,” Gu said.
“China can indirectly provide support to Riyadh, including assistance with advanced weapons systems, through the security cooperation framework between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.”
Saudi-China military cooperation has evolved from simple procurement to advanced technology transfers. A US$5 billion deal this year established a Jeddah assembly line for the Chinese Wing Loong-3 combat and reconnaissance drone, while Beijing is reportedly helping Saudi Arabia produce solid-fuel ballistic missiles at sites such as Al-Watah.
Riyadh has also been expanding its security cooperation with Beijing. Last year, their navies conducted joint exercises that included counterterrorism training, underwater mine detection and disposal operations.
Geoffrey Miller, a geopolitical analyst with Victoria University of Wellington’s Democracy Project, said the war had once again shuffled the cards in the Gulf and reopened all options.
Before the conflict, Riyadh had been cultivating close relations with the US, positioning itself as Washington’s key regional partner.
“However, the experience of the war, combined with events from Trump’s first term, has taught Mohammed bin Salman that US security guarantees are important, but are by no means unconditional or the only option,” Miller said.
He was referring to Trump’s muted response to Houthi rebel strikes on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019 that deeply unsettled the kingdom’s sense of security. This insecurity deepened last year when Israel struck Hamas headquarters in Qatar, a major non-Nato ally of the US.
These experiences have spurred Saudi Arabia to look beyond its traditional dependence on Washington. In September, Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan signed a mutual defence agreement, a move interpreted as a de facto extension of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence.
James Dorsey, a senior fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, noted that Riyadh was likely to ramp up investment in domestic military industries to push for greater self-reliance.
However, its US-anchored security ecosystem would set firm limits on how far military technology cooperation with China could go, he added.
“Ultimately, Gulf militaries have built around US equipment and procedures, and that’s not something that can be changed overnight. Interoperability could become a big issue, putting countries like China at a disadvantage.”
According to Dorsey, US officials are concerned that Saudi Arabia’s deepening ties with Beijing could allow China access to sensitive defence information.
Those concerns were amplified when US intelligence warned that Riyadh’s security ties with Beijing could expose its advanced F‑35 stealth technology, following Washington’s decision last year to approve its sale to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia remains significantly reliant on US weapons, even as it pushes to diversify its arms imports.
Spain, France, South Korea and China are emerging as key players in this diversification effort. Meanwhile, under its Vision 2030 initiative, the kingdom has pledged to localise more than 50 per cent of its military equipment spending by 2030.
China is likely to play a role in Riyadh’s post-war strategy, though Riyadh has shown no interest in dismantling US-centred security cooperation, according to Guo Hai, executive dean of the Institute of Public Policy at South China University of Technology.
“Saudi collaboration with China will likely remain limited to functional areas, as strategic cooperation is constrained by the deeply embedded US presence in the Middle East,” he said.
Saudi Arabia was cautious about both Iran and Israel emerging as dominant powers in the Middle East, Guo said, adding that the US-Iran conflict had bolstered Israel’s military strength and increased Riyadh’s wariness.
“However, Israel’s current offensive posture is unlikely to last long. For Saudi Arabia, the best long-term strategy remains ensuring a continued American presence in the Middle East as the ultimate counterweight.”
Miller in New Zealand added that China’s ties with Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor could provide Saudi Arabia with opportunities, noting that there might also be room for defence partnerships with China for some drone and missile systems.
“The [Gulf] region is more willing than at any time in the past to ‘look East’ and cultivate ties with new partners to build relationships that go beyond traditional friends in North America and Europe,” he said.
Saudi Arabia may emerge from the conflict seeking to strengthen its ties not only with the US but also with Pakistan and Turkey, according to Stefanie Hausheer Ali, a non-resident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programmes.
“Gulf Arab states will continue to have close economic relationships with China, but will want to avoid crossing US red lines such as allowing China to build military bases, because they will not want to jeopardise their access to cutting-edge AI chips or US military equipment and cooperation,” she wrote in an article published by the Atlantic Council on Monday. -- SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
