Whether it wraps up quickly or drags on, the repercussions of the US-Israeli war on Iran will echo for years, reshaping warfare, geopolitics, energy security and global perceptions of American tactical and strategic power. In the first of a three-part series, Mark Magnier looks at how the Iran war may alter Beijing’s approach to potential conflict over Taiwan, asymmetrical weaponry and the United States as an adversary.
The US military is formidable, well-disciplined, projects deadly force rapidly and is tactically impressive. However, its drone warfare has struggled – even as concerns over inflation and casualties reduce support for a protracted war potentially benefiting an authoritarian system not subject to electoral pressure.
These are among the lessons the People’s Liberation Army is likely to draw as it studies the Pentagon’s tactics and strategy in the Iran war, with an eye to any eventual Washington-Beijing conflict over Taiwan, according to analysts and former Pentagon and CIA officials.
“The Chinese military is going to go to school on this,” said Dennis Wilder, a former US Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council official. “For the Chinese, the question is, will this work and is this workable for us.”
“And we’re not at the conclusion of that story,” added Wilder, a senior fellow at Georgetown University.
Parts of the conflict are not directly translatable. US President Donald Trump apparently did not consult US allies other than Israel, whereas any Taiwan conflict is likely to involve Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and potentially Europe.
But the war is a valuable opportunity to study US strengths and weaknesses, particularly given that the PLA has not “tasted blood” since its 1979 war with Vietnam.
The PLA and the Pentagon both ‘learning armies’
The US and Israeli air campaign quickly hit over 13,000 targets, knocking out Iran’s air defences and exhibiting prowess in airborne refuelling.
Despite Trump’s threat to bomb Iran “back to the stone ages”, however, the US has apparently ignored a truism of military aviation.
“If you have a determined adversary, that has national resilience, that can absorb the blows, air power alone may not be sufficient to achieve victory,” said David Finkelstein, a distinguished fellow with independent research institute CNA.
“That’s an important lesson for everybody. It certainly is as they think about Taiwan.”
This is also an opportunity to assess the performance of new or newly deployed US weapons, including precision strike missiles, attack and interceptor drones, the growing use of artificial intelligence and new generation Tomahawk missiles.
“We’ve been using some stuff for the first time that we have been keeping under wraps, and for the Chinese some of the same stuff that could be used against them,” said Dennis Blasko, an independent analyst and former military intelligence officer.
The PLA and the Pentagon are known as “learning armies”. During the first Gulf war, China – with its then-bloated PLA dominated by land forces – was shocked into reform, analysts said.
A particular wake-up call was the 1991 Battle of 73 Easting. In just 23 minutes, a vastly outnumbered US tank force led by Captain H.R. McMaster destroyed 28 tanks and 16 armoured personnel carriers from an elite Iraqi Republican Guard unit – all without a single US loss.
In the subsequent decades, the PLA has halved its size, emphasised quality and technology over quantity and bolstered its navy, air force and strategic rocket forces.
But any lessons from Iran, analysts said, were likely to be more incremental than revolutionary and, in some cases, reinforce what the force believed it was doing right.
Iran shows US drone warfare lacking
One likely early take is that US interceptors proved highly effective – shooting down by some accounts 92 per cent of their targets – but that US drone warfare needs work.
Iranian drones, reliant on Chinese components, have performed relatively well, killing US troops and launching confusing swarms that saw Kuwait shoot down three US F-15 fighter jets in a friendly-fire incident.
Also effective have been Tehran’s strikes on soft US-linked targets in the Gulf region, like housing, fuel depots and logistics hubs as well as early warning radar systems housed under vulnerable fibreglass coverings.
That undercut US targeting, prompting the Pentagon to reposition its Terminal High Altitude Area Defence, or THAAD, systems from South Korea.
The war has also highlighted a disconnect that first emerged in Ukraine, as US interceptors costing millions of dollars are deployed against Iranian drones costing as little as US$20,000.
This economic mismatch has seen costly US munitions rapidly depleted even as hugely expensive ships, tanks and aircraft become increasingly vulnerable.
“The US military really does remain operationally exquisite, especially in joint operations, [something] that China isn’t capable of doing because we have the experience,” said Jacob Stokes, a senior fellow with the Centre for a New American Security.
“It’s a dichotomy. What they do, they do extremely well. But how long can they sustain it?”
“Some of the things that would be safe havens in another era are now big juicy targets,” he added.
This is a double-edged sword for Beijing. While it pioneered inexpensive drones and excels at low-cost, high-volume production, Beijing would be vulnerable to the same economics in any potential Taiwan attack it mounted.
This evolving dynamic is also creating entirely new battle calculations involving when to use or be willing to lose various types of equipment, some of which will inevitably be hit.
Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China, to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed by law to supplying it with weapons.
The growing effectiveness of asymmetric weaponry also made it increasingly difficult to hold territory, analysts said, which helps explain why the powerful US military has stayed clear of the Strait of Hormuz.
“You use up interceptors very, very fast, and the Chinese were always going to have more salvoes able to get through US interceptors without much trouble,” said Zack Cooper, senior fellow with the conservative American Enterprise Institute.
“But if China wants to take Taiwan, it can’t take Taiwan with drones. It still has to get people across the [Taiwan] Strait and resupply them.”
He added: “Every military is going to be looking at how much of the expensive platforms do we need, what’s the right mix.”
Lessons for China from Iran: tech performance, illusion of ‘quick war’
The PLA is also expected to carefully assess its own equipment deployed by Iran, including anti-stealth, guidance and satellite systems and air defence and surface-to-air missiles.
While these bolstered Tehran’s intelligence, analysts said, they have struggled against US and Israeli electronic and stealth technology.
The hugely expensive use of US munitions and redeployment of equipment from Asia to the Middle East also leaves the Pentagon with less in reserve for any conflict with the PLA, while returning THAAD systems to South Korea could reignite the 2017 political firestorm seen when they were initially deployed.
“China is realising that Iran is a sponge for US military power, and that’s all to China’s benefit,” Stokes said.
Another salient, if hardly new, lesson from Iran has been the attractive illusion of a quick war that rapidly widens and entraps those involved, fuelling unintended consequences that backfire, particularly in democracies where voters have a say.
Trump initially seemed to believe he was immune from past “forever wars” and could mount a “short-term excursion” after Venezuela’s rapid capitulation.
This week finds him struggling for an exit as Iran fights back, his polling numbers hitting new lows and US petrol prices and inflation mounting.
Analysts add that while US casualties remain relatively low so far, a single well-placed strike could alter the script for the Pentagon and Trump’s sagging political fortunes.
“If we start suffering serious casualties, it will be much tougher for us just to say ‘Oh, well, it’s just an excursion’,” said Blasko, a former military attache at the US embassy in Beijing.
Iran shows how to expand war horizontally by targeting allies, economies
Taiwan and the mainland, meanwhile, will both draw lessons from Iran’s ability to expand the war horizontally – by attacking US-allied Gulf nations and economically through its stranglehold over the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
For Taiwan, an effective counter to any mainland attack or blockade may be less about a military response than economic pressure on trade-dependent Beijing, as massive container ships suddenly become uninsurable.
While Taiwan and the mainland are far more integrated in the global economy than sanctioned Iran, international political pressure and Taipei’s position astride one of the world’s major trade routes remain a deterrent against any Beijing attack.
According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, some 20 per cent of global maritime trade passes through the Taiwan Strait.
“If you’re Taiwan, it would hurt your economy too, but you’re fighting for your existence,” Stokes said.
“They would try to get [Beijing] to either back off or try to bring the economy to a place where either the control of [Chinese President] Xi Jinping or the party writ large starts to come under pressure.”
“But Taiwan is also going to be less inclined to, at least in the exact same way, take the entire global economy hostage.”
Would a decapitation strike work on Taiwan?
US strikes on Venezuela and Iran, meanwhile, offer contrasting lessons on the relative merits of a “decapitation” strategy Beijing might consider in any Taiwan attack.
In Venezuela, US Special Forces quickly captured and removed former president Nicolas Maduro while, in Iran, despite outstanding US and Israeli intelligence, the killing of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei failed to topple the regime.
“We’re assuming they have pretty good intelligence network on the island,” Blasko said of Beijing.
“That’s one thing they could say, it’s more feasible than we might’ve thought.”
Analysts said that even as Beijing, Taiwan and the US pored over the lessons emerging from this war, the best-case scenario was that they would never need to be applied.
“If God forbid some sort of dust-up were to happen in the Taiwan Strait, the impact would be even greater than the Iran war because of the amount of shipping that goes through the South China Sea,” Finkelstein said.
“It’s almost unthinkable what would be unleashed, which is why it’s the last option, not the preferred option, for everybody.”
“This war is still unfolding,” he added. “It’s going to be a while before analysts anywhere in the world really put their heads around everything they’ve learned.” -- SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
