KHARKIV REGION, Ukraine, Nov 18 (Reuters) - Ground robots mounted with machine guns attack Russian positions; later, small groups of elite troops edge forward under the cover of drones; electronic jamming in the skies above scrambles enemy signals.
The futuristic scenes played out over the spring and summer on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine, where Kyiv's Operation Vivaldi combined soldiers and machines in potent new ways to push back Russian forces.
The counteroffensive ended last month in a rare battlefield success for Ukraine. While it didn't regain much territory, it thwarted part of Russia's pincer advance on the "fortress belt" of eastern cities that could be critical to the war's outcome.
The operation also showed how, with precise orchestration of highly trained troops and a wide assortment of air and ground technologies, it's possible to penetrate the "kill zone", the drone-infested corridor straddling the frontline that's made any advances extremely costly.
During Vivaldi, Ukraine deployed remotely controlled ground vehicles equipped with high-caliber machine guns, grenade launchers or explosives to strike Russian positions. Others cleared minefields.
In at least one instance, combat robots were dropped behind enemy lines by repurposed quadcopter bomber drones in what the Ukrainian military said was a first for the war.
As assault troops inched forward, aerial drones swept down to hit dugouts deemed too risky for humans to enter first. Stretching over the battlefield, a "protective dome" of electronic warfare knocked out enemy drones, according to the Third Army Corps, which carried out the operation.
Commanders said Vivaldi showed that increasingly smart integration of drones and robots could mitigate Kyiv's troop deficit against a much bigger Russian army. It did, however, take one of Ukraine's premier forces to pull off the complex operation, which used the military-grade version of Elon Musk's Starlink service for some battlefield communications.
In conventional warfare, a company or battalion's battlefield assets might comprise a few dozen armored vehicles and a handful of command and observation posts, Brig. Gen. Andrii Biletskyi said.
"Now, a thousand assets can be in the sky and on the ground in the same area at the same time."
And while troops once trained primarily alongside armored vehicles, "now we're developing a concept where the infantryman has to be in combat formation together with robotic systems", said Third Corps commander Dmytro Rohoziuk.
Russian officials haven't commented publicly on the counteroffensive, though have said that their troops continue to advance along the 1,200 km (750-mile) front in Ukraine.
Moscow's forces also wield a variety of air and ground drones, as well as electronic warfare, to powerful effect in Ukraine. The conflict, which has lasted almost five years, has redefined modern fighting and seen both sides race to develop new drones and countermeasures.
Russia's defense ministry did not respond to questions about Operation Vivaldi for this article.
Christopher Tuck, an expert in strategic studies at King's College London, said Vivaldi was a limited victory.
"They were able to inflict an operationally significant defeat on the Russians in terms of defeating one of their key attempts to outflank the fortress belt," he said. "But it's still an offensive operation that was local in its impact."
VIVALDI'S FOUR SEASONS
Reuters visited the Third Corps' base of operations in the northeastern Kharkiv region and interviewed six participants in Vivaldi, including ground troops and senior commanders, to understand how the operation unfolded.
The mission's success was amplified by Kyiv through a sleek media campaign around a rare piece of good news that pierced the gloom of a grinding war that has seen Ukrainian cities come under massive air bombardment this year.
Although the counteroffensive freed just 277 sq km (107 sq miles) of 177,000 sq km of Ukraine occupied by Russia, it repelled Russian attempts to encircle the city of Sloviansk by reclaiming a key zone of land - or salient - to the north, according to the Ukrainian military.
While Reuters couldn't independently verify Ukrainian battlefield accounts, Vivaldi's territorial gains have been recorded by open-source analysts mapping the front line.
The operation's name refers to its four phases, in a nod to the composer's "Four Seasons" concertos. Initial stages involved preparing the way for the assault on the salient and were carried out under high secrecy, with few outside senior command knowing the plan's ultimate ambitions, participants said.
Those early moves included flushing out and eliminating Russian infiltrators who'd crept through porous defenses in small groups to establish footholds inside Ukrainian-held territory.
Mid-range strike drones hit Russian supply routes and command posts dozens of miles behind the front line, while air-defense units targeted Russian reconnaissance drones to blind Moscow's view of the preparations.
Closer to the battlefield, drone pilots hunted their Russian counterparts, helping clear skies over Ukrainian infantrymen.
Conventional trickery played a part, too. An initial coordinated assault lured the Russians into defending one part of the salient, as other units prepared the main drive elsewhere, according to Ukrainian commanders.
Ground advances involved small teams carefully piercing the kill zone before regrouping to drive out Moscow's troops from the salient last month, they said. Sustaining momentum was critical for preventing the enemy from building stable defenses.
Central to each step of the operation was a new command culture aimed at breaking a rigid, Soviet-style hierarchy by encouraging initiative in the field, participants said.
"There's no major sitting somewhere telling us how many sorties we can fly," said a drone-company commander with the call sign Zhora.
SINGLE ELECTRONIC BATTLEFIELD
Ukrainian commanders acknowledged such an operation could be difficult to replicate given the technical complexities of navigating the kill zone, an area stretching more than a dozen miles either side of the front where vast armies of drones swarming the skies make any movement potentially fatal.
"All this requires a single electronic battlefield," said Biletskyi. "Even the most advanced units, ours and the enemy's, stand only at the beginning of this path."
Starshield, the military version of the Starlink satellite communications service owned by Musk's SpaceX, was used to direct many strike drones and other unmanned systems.
The counteroffensive had largely been concluded before Ukraine said last month that limits had been abruptly imposed on its use of Starshield. The restrictions, and confusion about who had ordered the move, nonetheless raised concerns in Kyiv about the potential perils of banking on the service, for which there is no viable alternative.
Despite Ukraine's smaller attacking force, it lost around seven times fewer troops than Russia during the counteroffensive, according to Biletskyi. He added that Kyiv's wounded outnumbered its dead.
Reuters was not able to independently verify those comparisons. Battlefield casualties are rarely disclosed. For the war as a whole, Western estimates put their combined losses in the hundreds of thousands, with Russian losses easily outstripping Ukraine's.
Although Vivaldi didn't represent a decisive shift in the war in Ukraine's favor, said Tuck of King's College London, it showed Kyiv can drive up the cost for Russia of capturing critical Ukrainian defensive zones like the fortress belt.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has said he wants all of Donetsk, including the fortress belt cities, before he would consider suing for peace.
Military analyst Rob Lee of the U.S.-based Foreign Policy Research Institute said Vivaldi had showcased the potential of the Third Corps' vision for war, but took place in an area less saturated with drones than some other parts of the front.
The months of fighting, he added, proved that punching through the kill zone remains a serious challenge for Ukraine's undermanned military: "It shows how difficult it is to do offensive operations on the battlefield."
(Additional reporting by Vitalii Hnidyi; Editing by Mike Collett-White, Dan Flynn and Pravin Char)
