THE geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is shifting once again. Moments of upheaval often expose long-standing illusions and compel nations to rethink assumptions that have guided their policies for decades. Today, amid the ongoing Israeli-US aggression against Iran and following the martyrdom of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the time has come for Arab states – particularly those in the Gulf – to reassess and reset their relationship with Iran.
For more than four decades, relations between Iran and much of the Arab world have been defined by suspicion, rivalry, and strategic hostility. The roots of this divide can largely be traced to the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. The overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic republic sent shockwaves through the region. Many Arab monarchies, already grappling with fragile political systems and internal social pressures, feared that revolutionary fervour could spill across borders and inspire unrest within their own societies.
These fears shaped regional politics for decades. Arab leaders viewed the new Iranian state not merely as a neighbour with a different ideology, but as a potential existential threat. This fear factor was compounded by constant instigation by the West, in particular, the US that Iran was a threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Arab states. Such moves were at the behest of Israel which already had set its sight on a future “regime change” operation in Iran. The revolutionary rhetoric emanating from Tehran, combined with regional conflicts and proxy rivalries, reinforced this perception. The political climate of the time was heavily influenced by the US and Europe that had their own strategic calculations in the Middle East.
The creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 must be understood within this broader context. While the GCC was presented as a framework for economic and security cooperation among Gulf monarchies, it was chiefly, in practice, set up as a response to perceived Iranian influence or “threat” following the revolution. Western powers – particularly the US – strongly supported such regional alignments as part of their broader strategy to contain Iran and maintain their strategic foothold in the Gulf.
From Washington’s perspective, the revolutionary Iranian state posed a challenge not only to regional allies but also to American dominance in one of the world’s most energy-rich regions. As a result, the US pursued policies aimed at isolating Iran while strengthening its military partnerships with Arab states.
During the 1980s and beyond, this strategy led to a deepening security relationship between the US and Gulf monarchies. American military bases and defence infrastructure expanded across the region – from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and elsewhere. These arrangements were justified as necessary to protect the sovereignty and security of the Gulf states. Actually, these bases were not for the host country’s protection but for America’s military missions in West Asia as seen in the current attack on Iran.
The assumption underlying this system was that Western powers – especially the US – would act as guarantors of stability and defenders of Arab interests in times of crisis. Yet under the current conflict situation, despite demands from the Arab leaders that their territories not be used as staging grounds for the assault on Iran, the US has not bothered but mobilised its assets in region for the Iran campaign.
In the current conflict environment, Washington’s priorities appear clearer than ever. American policy has been overwhelmingly focused on safeguarding Israel’s security and maintaining its strategic dominance in the region. Meanwhile, Gulf states that have long hosted American bases and aligned themselves with US policy often find their own concerns relegated to secondary importance. Between Israel and the Arab states, the Americans would definitely choose the former.
This reality highlights a fundamental truth of international politics: no external power, more so the US, acts out of altruism. States pursue their own interests above all else. For the US, the Middle East has long been important for energy security, strategic positioning, and the protection of key allies – most notably Israel. The defence and political autonomy of Arab states are not the primary objective.
The lesson for the region is clear. Reliance on the US cannot substitute for regional cooperation and mutual understanding. If anything, decades of rivalry between Arab states and Iran have only served to deepen divisions that the Americans have exploited.
It is precisely for this reason that the current moment presents an opportunity. The recent rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia demonstrated that long-standing hostilities are not immutable. Diplomatic engagement, when pursued sincerely, can reduce tensions and open new avenues for cooperation.
But this process must go further. A limited thaw between two major regional players is not enough. What is needed is a broader and more comprehensive regional reset – one that includes all neighbouring Arab states and seeks to replace the politics of fear with the politics of trust, brotherhood and dialogue.
For decades, a narrative of Iranian domination has shaped Arab strategic thinking. While legitimate concerns about regional influence and security certainly exist, the persistence of this fear mentality has often prevented meaningful engagement. In many cases, it has also been reinforced by external powers, particularly the US whose strategic interests are served by keeping regional actors divided.
Breaking out of this cycle will not be easy. Historical grievances, ideological differences, and competing geopolitical ambitions remain significant obstacles. Yet the alternative – perpetual rivalry and reliance on the US – has proven costly and destabilising.
A more constructive path would involve developing a regional security architecture built on dialogue, mutual respect, and shared interests. Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf share geography, history, trade routes, and economic interdependence. Stability in the Gulf is not a zero-sum game; it is a collective necessity.
Arab leaders must therefore ask themselves a difficult but essential question: when the next major crisis erupts, who will truly stand with them? If recent history is any guide, external powers will prioritise their own strategic interests. When it comes to the crunch, regional actors may find themselves largely on their own.
Recognising this reality should not be seen as a sign of weakness, but as an opportunity for strategic maturity. A new regional framework – one that includes constructive engagement with Iran – could reduce tensions, enhance stability, and allow Middle Eastern states to take greater ownership of their collective future.
The moment calls for courage and vision. For starters, all the American bases should be closed down. This would be a first step that would free the region from unnecessary tension. It would signal commitment for a new order based on trust and brotherhood.
The Middle East has spent too many decades defined by divisions rooted in fear and US manipulation. A reset in Arab-Iranian relations would not erase the past, but it could open the door to a more stable and independent regional order.
And perhaps, at this critical juncture, that is precisely what the region needs.
Dr Abdul Latiff Mohd Ibrahim is head of the Research and Publications Division at the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia. The views expressed here are solely the writer’s own.
