SINGAPORE: Foreign ministers gathered in scenic Cebu for the opening event of the Philippines’ chairmanship of Asean in late January but went away without agreeing on whether to recognise Myanmar’s recent election.
It was yet another stalemate for the group.
Analysts told The Straits Times that while some member states desire a pragmatic exit from a political deadlock over recognising the junta-led election outcome, their prioritisation of national interests over the grouping’s collective unity has resulted in an impasse.
Asean member states fall broadly into three categories in their stance on Myanmar – with some wishing to move on, while others stick to their guns about not recognising the junta-led regime in the country until certain conditions are met, and the rest settle somewhere in-between these positions.
The Philippines, which recently took over the Asean chairmanship from Malaysia, considers the Myanmar issue a priority. But the impasse adds to a growing list of stalemates for the 11-member regional grouping and could cast a cloud over the first few months of the Philippines’ chairmanship.
Five years since a military coup ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in February 2021, Aseanhas made little progress in improving the situation in civil war-torn Myanmar.
In April that year, Asean drafted a peace plan and decided to ban Myanmar’s military leaders from its high-level meetings. Myanmar officially joined Asean in 1997.
The peace plan, also known as the Five-Point Consensus, calls for an immediate end to violence, constructive dialogue, the appointment of a special envoy, humanitarian assistance, and a visit by a regional delegation – conditions that Myanmar’s military government has largely ignored.
After all this time, the “shock factor” of the coup is no longer there, and Asean, to some extent, appears to have “adapted” to living with the situation in Myanmar, said Dr Tang Siew Mun, senior fellow of the regional strategic and political studies programme at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
However, the recent polls in Myanmar, flawed as it may be, might offer an opportunity for Asean to recalibrate its position on the country.
The election, which was held in three stages from December 2025 through January 2026, was widely characterized as “limited” by the international community because it excluded large segments of the population, geography, and political spectrum.
Split into three camps?
Sharon Seah, a senior fellow on Asean studies at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, believes Asean member states are split into three camps on the Myanmar issue.
One camp is willing to consider the election outcome – warts and all – and move on with “the so-called ‘transition’”, she said, noting that Asean no longer uses the phrase “transition to democracy”.
That phrase, which was frequently used by the grouping in the 1990s and 2010s, has of late been replaced with more generic terms like “political transition” or simply “transition”.
“This implies that Asean could accept Myanmar back to the table once there is a ‘transition’ presumably to a sort of mixed civilian-military government,” she said.
“Exactly how, the process or the level of support from Myanmar’s citizens does not matter.”
The second camp is concerned that Asean’s acceptance of the polls outcome would give Myanmar’s junta “wrong signals” that the atrocities it has committed since the coup would be swept under the carpet – a view that is “grounded more in human rights than democracy”.
The third camp quietly “supports Asean’s consensus on non-recognition while pragmatically conducting lowkey diplomacy with Myanmar”, she added.
Seah did not identify which countries are in which camps, as their positions tend to be fluid.
Manila eyes peacebroker role
The Code of Conduct (COC) – a set of rules meant to ease tensions between China and Asean member states in the South China Sea – was expected to be in the spotlight after the Philippines took over as Asean chair on Jan 1, 2026.
The Philippines is a key claimant in the South China Sea where territorial disputes have often placed it in tense maritime standoffs with China.
Instead, barely two months in, Manila appears to be focusing much of its diplomatic capital elsewhere.
Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro made a controversial visit to Naypyidaw just days into her role as the Asean chair’s special envoy on Myanmar at the start of the year, sparking speculation about whether this was to pave the way for Myanmar’s military leaders to return to the Asean fold.
In Cebu City on Jan 29, Lazaro said the grouping was not recognising the Myanmar election “for now” – two words that analysts said were a teaser that prompted a natural question: Then when?
“It tells you a lot – that of all the issues facing Asean, the Philippines seems to be investing a lot on the Myanmar issue, when everyone is expecting that it should be the Code of Conduct,” said Dr Aries Arugay, a visiting fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
He believes the government likely sees the chairmanship as an opportunity to project globally that it is a viable builder of peace and consensus.
This would help to strengthen the Philippines’ candidacy for one of the 10 non-permanent seats at the UN Security Council, giving it an international platform to push for a legally binding COC based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dr Arugay said.
While China’s veto power may block formal UN resolutions, that seat could allow Manila to rally international support for a rules-based order in the South China Sea.
Sticking to initial principles
Malaysia, Asean chair in 2025, is the only member state to have spoken strongly against the recent election in Myanmar, insisting that the grouping not send observers or certify the polls.
Only Cambodia and Vietnam sent observers to the recent polls.
Kuala Lumpur contends that unless the polls are endorsed by both sides of Myanmar’s political divide – an unlikely scenario given the ongoing civil war – the impasse over recognition of the recent election would remain unresolved. Analysts told ST it is likely that Brunei, Indonesia and Timor Leste would be aligned with the Malaysian position – even if Indonesia’s involvement may have waned in recent years.
While Indonesia did not send observers to the election, thus implying a lack of endorsement, Dr Lina Alexandra, who heads the department of international relations at the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said it was “unfortunate” that Jakarta has not made its views explicitly known on the matter.
She believes Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s foreign policy vision is centred on raising Indonesia’s profile on the global stage – going by his recent debut at the World Economic Forum to engage international business and political leaders – more so than nurturing its leadership in the region.
Ready to move on
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam appear to be leaning towards recognising Myanmar’s election outcome, analysts told ST, as shown by Thai foreign minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow’s comments after the Cebu meetings.
He told reporters that Bangkok viewed the Myanmar election as a potential opening for dialogue and “the start of a transition”, while calling for a “calibrated engagement”.
“We think that we have to engage with the regime in Naypyidaw, the new one. They’re going to form a government probably in March,” he told Reuters.
Thailand, which shares a 2,416-km border with Myanmar, likely sees itself as a “frontline state”. It currently hosts over 80,000 Myanmar refugees and regularly provides financial aid to support humanitarian efforts, including in the wake of natural disasters.
Analysts say the kingdom may also be relatively more sympathetic to its neighour, having undergone similar experiences – with 13 coups since 1932, the most recent being in 2014.
“Thailand is one of the theoretical models that Myanmar could actually follow, and it looks like with the elections, they seem to be learning quite a lot from the Thai playbook.” Dr Tang said.
Dr Sok Udom Deth, professor of international relations at Paragon International University in Phnom Penh, said: “Rather than fixating on the issue of electoral legitimacy (in Myanmar), the Cambodian government values security and regime stability as preconditions for national development.”
And Dr Seun Sam, policy analyst at the Royal Academy of Cambodia think-tank, believes the Five-Point Consensus is now “not suitable”, adding: “Asean should provide more space and chances for Myanmar to meet and talk with them.”
Laos and Vietnam have traditionally not been vocal on this matter except to support the current Asean chair.
But in a news release after the Cebu meetings, Vietnam foreign minister Le Hoai Trung said he favoured having Asean “consider new measures to advance the Five-Point Consensus in light of recent developments in Myanmar”, signalling Hanoi’s support to depart from Asean’s status quo on Myanmar.
Henrick Tsjeng, an associate research fellow at Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, noted that Laos even expressed support for the election and intended to send observers, even if this reportedly did not occur.
As these five Asean members, together with China, are also separately part of the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation, a framework to promote connectivity and sustainable development in this subregion, it is no surprise their views on Myanmar seem aligned.
Taking the middle ground
Some countries want to stick with initial principles and others want to move on, said Associate Professor Simon Tay, who chairs the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA).
The situation is changing and Singapore’s position is likely somewhere in between, he noted.
“Singapore is principled enough to not unsee what happened, but we have to be pragmatic enough that there have been shifts on the ground (since the Myanmar coup),” he said.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan said in Cebu on Jan 29 that meaningful political progress in Myanmar requires a cessation of hostilities, inclusive dialogue and participation by all stakeholders – preconditions “necessary for a government with legitimacy and a measure of popular support to emerge”.
Seah said his remarks imply that Myanmar’s elections do not meet these conditions.
Assoc Prof Tay pointed out that holding elections does not change anything, since elections are not part of what the Five-Point Consensus calls for.
He added that what Asean wants to see is an end to the conflict in Myanmar and the start of a dialogue; it is less concerned about who is in charge, even if it is a military government.
This, he noted, is also a key reason why Asean had reacted differently to the Thai coup.
“The previous Thai coup was not violent and stability was established quickly with most accepting the government led by General Prayut,” he said, adding that stability and a sense of legitimacy are hallmarks in Asean history, rather than democracy per se.
In Myanmar’s case, there is mass violence and large-scale unrest, he said. “The military in Myanmar has killed many citizens.”
Asked why Singapore has not made a stronger statement similar to that of Malaysia and the Philippines, Assoc Prof Tay said Singapore is principled but also pragmatic.
““if we paint ourselves into a corner, and Asean paints itself into a corner while the rest of the world moves on, is that the wisest thing to do?” he said.
Myanmar and Russia signed a five-year military cooperation pact in early February, while China has thrown its backing behind the junta.
Analysts said what would be troubling for Asean is if other countries or superpowers started recognising the military government, as that would signal to Myanmar that it does not need to engage Asean.
“It makes Asean, then, less effective, if not, unfortunately, less relevant,” said Dr Arugay.
On Singapore’s part, Assoc Prof Tay said the city-state would likely be very concerned about a potential “rupture” within Asean.
“The part that is uncomfortable – if you’re trying to hold Asean together – is if you give up on the (Five-Point) consensus, and you have no new consensus,” he said. “If there is a new consensus, we can be part of creating and moving to that new consensus.”
Is an Asean consensus forthcoming?
Some analysts say Asean’s lack of consensus may underscore deeper internal division, while others felt that it is little more than an “embarrassment” five years on.
Asean’s difficulty lies in balancing its impetus to not intervene in a member state’s domestic affairs – a bedrock of the grouping – while ensuring some key principles are not compromised, so as not to undermine its credibility.
Yet, the lack of a coherent response toward Myanmar since the 2021 coup is an indication that the grouping does not have the teeth to take the regime to task.
The Myanmar government could end up being the winner in the long run if the grouping’s stance on the regime shifts to a more conciliatory, tacit acceptance later in the year.
“It seems like Asean’s options are getting narrower because given the results of the elections, the perception is that this would further embolden the junta, as they have legitimised themselves” said Dr Arugay.
However, Seah believes Asean’s position is not static, but one that is dynamic and will evolve.
“Changes in neighbouring countries’ domestic priorities and foreign policy approaches, especially with ongoing political shifts, could lead to a sudden emergence of consensus on Myanmar.” - The Straits Times/ANN
