BANGKOK: Political equations after the election are forecast to produce no landslide winner, raising a strong possibility of a coalition government between Pheu Thai (red) and Bhumjaithai (blue).
A key condition for joining hands is that the “spiritual leaders” of both parties must be able to negotiate, clear the agreement, and resolve past conflicts in a way that is acceptable.
A major obstacle that must be dealt with is old legal cases linked to leading figures on both sides, such as the Khao Kradong case and various cases involving Thaksin Shinawatra, which could be used as bargaining conditions.
It must be acknowledged that Thailand’s political arithmetic at this hour, in the final countdown before voters go to the polls in the general election on Feb 8, 2026, has been framed by every political watcher, every bureau, and leading pollsters as a top-three race that inevitably comes down to three camps: Pheu Thai, Bhumjaithai, and the People’s Party.
Three camps, three colours, three factions are each deploying every tactic and political manoeuvre in the hope of stirring momentum in the final stretch, with two weeks remaining.
Political arithmetic is being analysed to suggest that none of these three camps will reach 200 seats; at best, winning more than 150 seats would already be considered a strong political result.
The People’s Party is being set the task of taking first place in party-list MPs, while in constituency seats it faces a hard fight, as it must topple entrenched political “big houses” that exist across every region.
Bhumjaithai has set itself the task of using a formula to draw in local power networks into its camp, aiming to become the leader of the conservative bloc and to take the lead among the new right-wing current parties, calculating that it could rise to number one or number two—though the hard task is to push its party score up to be number one in this wing.
For Pheu Thai, it is not an easy job to reclaim the election championship after suffering its first defeat since Thai Rak Thai in 2001. A key task is to lock in “grade-A” MP candidates and pull in momentum from “grade-B” to “grade-C” candidates to parade into parliament, planting the flag to dominate the Northeast and the North as a variable that could flip it into the core party forming a government, while still aiming to win as many party-list points as possible.
It is expected that it will gain a popularity “fever” boost from Yodchanan Wongsawat, the party’s prime ministerial candidate, driving both the air war and the ground war through debate stages, social media, and major rally stages, opening its Northeast push in the “capital of the lower Northeast”, Nakhon Ratchasima, hoping not to cede any of the 16 constituencies to any other party.
From now on, attention must be paid to the political equation after Feb 8, 2026. Every bureau predicts a chance of a new government under a two-camp formula, with the other camp stepping back to become the opposition.
Checking the state and taking the temperature of the “deep state” remains a highly decisive factor in the deal to form a government. It is said that a key Pheu Thai figure has already checked the weather on the ground and the direction of the wind, and there is a high chance it could rise to power as the government, either as the core party forming a coalition or as a pivotal partner in a coalition.
There is a key, high-grade ministry that “big Pheu Thai” strongly wants: the Transport Ministry. It is certain that Suriya Juangroongruangkit, the prime ministerial candidate and election director for the red camp, has reserved the chair.
Whichever party ranks 1–3—between red, blue, and orange—the task for Pheu Thai is to set its total MP target at no fewer than 200 seats.
The People’s Party also wants enough MPs to form a government, without endorsing Anutin Charnvirakul as prime minister, repeating the MOA that was abruptly broken over drafting a new constitution.
Bhumjaithai likewise wants to be number one in the election field in order to hold the balance of power in bargaining for key ministerial seats, if its MP total comes in higher than expected.
As for the factors and conditions, the chances of the People’s Party forming a government are still seen as small, because the “deep state” still does not want the liberal, progressive wing—the “orange party”—to enter state power, even if it does not reward local power groups or lowers the ceiling on the most extreme policies, such as amending Section 112 of the Criminal Code.
But if the People’s Party cannot be number one, or does not win a decisive number of seats, and ends up merely first or second, this “equation” could be shifted into the opposition.
Therefore, it must whip up its momentum into an orange storm again in the final two weeks, because it knows its chances of becoming the government outright are lower than every other party.
For the conditions under which Pheu Thai can form a government, it must rank within 1–3. If Pheu Thai wins no fewer than 100 seats, and is number one, the red camp will move immediately to lead the formation of a government; but if it is number two or three, it is still highly likely to be in the governing bloc.
It is therefore looking for political allies to fill out the numbers—whether that means Bhumjaithai is necessary, or even that the Kla Tham Party cannot be left out.
The chances of Pheu Thai joining hands with Bhumjaithai to form a government, once the conditions are laid out, make it absolutely necessary that the “spiritual leaders” and big names of the two parties must deal and clear the agreement so it is accepted and they can move forward together.
The alleged collusion case involving senators and the Khao Kradong case: can the key figures of the blue and red camps accept this and move forward together? This is the last straw that caused their break when they were in government together under Paetongtarn Shinawatra.
The legal cases tied to Pheu Thai’s “spiritual leader”, including Thaksin Shinawatra, who is still not out of the thorns regarding an appeal in a Section 112 case. Although the court of first instance dismissed the petition, the karmic burden remains as a shackle on the “big boss” of the red camp, forcing him to choose to stop playing political games.
Not counting the various cases on the red camp side in which Paetongtarn and Thaksin may be squeezed or pressured, including criminal cases at the National Anti-Corruption Commission level—whether the audio clip of a conversation with Hun Sen, the PN promissory note case, the transfer of shares within the Shinawatra family network, as well as the case over a Shin Corp tax collection of more than 17.6 billion baht.
All of these are conditions that the “spiritual leaders” of the two camps must settle clearly. It must be watched closely: even if the MP total does not reach the target, the chance of bargaining for a coalition government between Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai is not something that cannot happen. - The Nation/ANN
